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ABSTRACT
In the late 1970's, many countries around the world started a shift toward more
liberal thinking on economic issues and conception of the state. In an attempt to reduce
the size of the government, the participation of the private sector was encouraged in areas
that were traditionally under the public domain. The infrastructure sector was greatly
affected by this new trend; governments found in this strategy a way of financing projects
that otherwise would have been delayed.
Because of the perceived importance of infrastructure for economic development,
several developing countries are now promoting the participation of the private sector in
infrastructure projects. The challenge they now face, is the development of an appropriate
environment to support this change and attract private investors; the special nature of
infrastructure projects and the diverse interests of the parties involved, demand complex
structures that require great effort and commitment for success. Risk management and
allocation is one of the activities that requires special attention.
A detailed study of the Colombian Toll Road Privatization Program --
complemented with the experiences in Mexico and Argentina -- embedded in the
theoretical framework developed, illustrates the numerous issues that need to be faced and
the reforms required for the development and implementation of such a program.
Although many amendments have to be done, it is still too early to judge the success of
the Colombian effort. The Colombian experience is valuable for the development of future
privatization programs in the country and in other countries that decide to move from
theory to practice.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Planning and Civil/Environmental Engineering
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s many countries around the world have started a shift towards
more liberal thinking on economic issues and on a conception of the state. The pioneers
of this shift were the United Kingdom with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1978-
1990), and the United States with President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989). This shift was
marked by the belief in the reduction of the government's size, implying a larger
participation of the private sector in areas where public participation has been
predominant. Under this scheme, governments should not get involved in the productive
sector, but instead direct their efforts towards regulation. in order to ensure an adequate
treatment of market failures.
Infrastructure is a sector that had to be affected by this model, partly for
ideological reasons, and partly because of the inability of governments to keep pace with
investment requirements. Infrastructure and public service provision such as energy,
water and sanitation, transport, and telecommunications were generally activities where
government participated heavily because of their attributes of natural monopolies, public
goods and/or strategic issues. Therefore, under liberal policies, this sector was to be
restructured, particularly by creating a new regulatory framework that allowed private
participation and responsiveness to the uniqueness of the infrastructure sector.
During this period of privatization, research has been carried out and theoretical
principles have been developed to help understand what should be done in order to
provide the adequate overall environment for the program's success. In additeon,
countries' experiences have enriched the comprehension of the issues involved in
infrastructure privatization. Although the experience cannot be totally translated to other
countries, a clear understanding of the issues can help policy makers act in advance and
avoid potential problems in the future.
Policy makers must be aware that privatization will be successful only when
developed for the right reasons and under the right framework. That is, when none of the
following "seven deadly sins of privatization" is the motor behind the process (UNDP,
93):
1) Short-term revenue for the national treasury -- the wrong reason;
2) Heavy government intervention that creates distortion and does not provide
anti-trust regulation -- the wrong environment;
3) Corruption and cronyism -- awarding assets or contracts without competitive
bidding;
4) Budget deficit financing through the sale of national assets;
5) Weak financial strategy that does not maximize revenue and protection to
national interest;
6) Weak labor strategy based on unrealistic promises to find support from
employees;
7) Lack of political consensus and commitment.
It is also important to note that an inadequate selection of projects could lead to
the failure of the privatization program.
Privatization Trend in the Developing World
Although the question about the causality between infrastructure and economic
development lingers, a general consensus on their correlation, and on the fact that the lack
of infrastructure can become a bottleneck for development (Hirschman, 1958; World Bank
1994b). Even further, the World Bank has tound a correlation between development --
measured by income per capita, and the level of the infrastructure stock in per capita
terms: on average, an increase of 1% in infrastructure stock, is linked with a 1% increase
in the GDP -- gross domestic product (World Bank, 1994b). Because of the importance
of infrastructure, in recent years several developing countries have undertaken programs
to include private sector participation in its financing, construction, and operation.
Governments have found in this new strategy a way of financing projects that otherwise
would have been delayed. Additionally, governments expect these programs to render
efficiency gains from private sector performance. The above have been the two main
reasons for undertaking concession programs.
Infrastructure requires large resources. For instance, the World Bank calculated
that Latin American and Caribbean countries need to invest US$ 100 billion, only to catch
up with the investment backlog resulting from the 1980's debt crisis (World Bank, 1995a).
The World Bank calculated the yearly investment needs as US$ 60 billion, or 4.4% of the
total GDP of the region. In addition, maintenance costs would amount to another US$ 7
million -- an extra 0.5% of GDP. This maintenance cost represents 2% of the
infrastructure stock, calculated as US$ 350 billion'.
At the heart of infrastructure privatization programs lies the management and
allocation of risk. In order to attract private participants, it is necessary for parties to have
a clear understanding of their responsibilities and rights. It is also a challenge for policy
makers to undertake this task, while creating attractive opportunities for all the parties. In
an ever more globalised world, country risks (e.g., policy changes, expropriation, inflation,
devaluation, foreign exchange availability and convertibility) become an important
challenge for developing countries. If they want to attract foreign resources, as well as a
wider pool of potential local investors, they would have to make an extra effort to show
the global community that their countries have evolved to a point where their
administration is more economically than politically driven. This implies having a fiscal
discipline that creates a sound macroeconomic environment. Therefore, before
implementing an infrastructure privatization program, economic reform should be in place
or at least in process.
S The composition of the infrastructure stock - US$ 350 billion - for Latin America and the
Caribbean is US$ 170 billion for the power sector, US$ 100 billion for transportation, US$ 60 billion for
water and sewerage, and US$ 20 billion for telecommunications.
The Thesis
This thesis concentrates on how the theory -- the principles of the neo-liberal
model -- have affected the practice since the 1980s and how the development of
infrastructure provision has been shaped by the constraints of the sector and by
technological advances. Chapter 3 analyzes the case of the Colombian Toll Roads and the
last part presents reflections over the main issues.
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework, including the conditions that are
believed to be necessary but not sufficient for the success of privatization programs.
Economic efficiency principles guide the framework. The chapter starts by introducing
the main concepts for the analysis of infrastructure privatization, particularly the attempt
to define "infrastructure," the identification of the main parties involved in the deals, their
interests and how they shape the agreements; the most common contractual possibilities
available for host governments; and the introduction of the trade-off between risk and
return as a base for private decision-making.
Chapter 2 then presents the main financial considerations, that are new for policy
makers when schemes for procuring public infrastructure existed. The main issues
addressed are the constraints that the specificities of infrastructure imply for the deals
between the private and public sectors, such as the consequences of requiring a substantial
participation of debt and how this leads to agreements where the lenders' guarantee is the
cashflow generated by the project, instead of the equity of the owners - concessionaires.
Special attention is given to the role of capital markets for a successful privatization
program, creating long term investment opportunities and enlarging the pool of resources
available.
The second chapter ends with a presentation of the principles for risk allocation
and other main aspects of road privatization programs. Political and regulatory risks, land
acquisition provisions, environmental licensing, cost overruns and minimum traffic
guarantees are among the issues discussed in this section.
The third chapter analyses the Colombian Toll Road Privatization Program. which
will be studied under the light of the theoretical model previously developed. For this
US$ 2.3 billion program, the government expects US$ 2 billion to come from the private
sector; the difference reflects resources that the government has considered necessary for
the marketability of certain projects. The total infrastructure privatization program
amounts to US$ 12.7 billion; US$ 9.3 billion comes from the private sector.
Since 1993, the government has awarded several toll roads to the private sector
for their rehabilitation, capacity expansion, operation and maintenance. As of April 1995,
10 road concessions have been awarded, accounting for about a third of the government's
goal for the period ending in 1998.
The Colombian case provides an interesting insight as it is a country where
extensive economic reforms have been carried out in recent years. Recognizing that
governments cannot successfully implement infrastructure privatization in the absence of
an adequate economic and regulatory environment, this chapter starts with a presentation
of the reforms that the government of Colombia has undertaken recently, with particular
emphasis on the infrastructure sector.
The Colombian Toll Road Privatization Program is analyzed through the review of
seven contracts awarded in 19942 and a number of informal interviews with some of the
main parties involved. Using the principles established in the second chapter the main
issues -- particularly those related with risk allocation -- are treated separately. In
addition, topics such as bid selection criteria, mechanisms for payments resulting from the
guarantees and toll levels are included. To enrich the analysis, the discussion refers to the
2 One of the contracts was actually signed on December 30, 1993.
Mexican and Argentinean cases. It is important to bear in mind that no single formula
exists, rather it is a dynamic process that provides room for improvement as it evolves.
The thesis ends with reflections about the main challenges that the Colombian
policy makers face for the success of the privatization program it has initiated.
II. THE THEORY
After an overview of the emergence of the privatization trend, it is important to
gain a deeper understanding of the main issues around the involvement of the private
sector in the provision of infrastructure services. Infrastructure has a set of characteristics
that distinguish it from other kinds of investment. These characteristics determine not
only the provision possibilities a government has, but in general the contractual schemes
that are required to implement them. It is important to highlight that the success of a
infrastructure privatization program depends not only in its design and implementation,
but also on the suitability and attractiveness for investment of the host country.
The participation of the private sector in different activities such as financing,
designing, constructing and operating the facility, brings complexity to the procurement
system. Risk and credibility become central issues, in ways that governments were not
traditionally used to handle. Policy makers are required to have a deep understanding of
these issues to avoid the formulation of over-simplistic or inadequate schemes. A policy
failing to address the interaction and the interests of the parties may fall apart, because of
its lack of ability to meet the parties' needs; potential win-win solutions could be wasted.
This chapter provides the tools to understand the main issues of infrastructure
privatization, and develops a framework for analysis. It also provides the principles for
policy design and implementation. The framework is qualitative rather than quantitative,
based on what is found in the literature to be "good practice" for privatization
implementation.
The first section introduces the base knowledge. It starts with an attempt to define
the term infrastructure. It then presents three different frameworks of analysis of
infrastructure procurement strategies, followed by the identification of the main parties,
their interests and inter-relations. The section ends with the introduction of the concept of
risk-return trade-off as the base for understanding private investment decision-making.
The second section deals with the financial aspects of privatization. With the
participation of the private sector, financial considerations become a central piece for the
success of the program. Infrastructure policy makers need to understand the main issues
in order to produce adequate programs. This section starts with a reinterpretation of the
characteristics of infrastructure from a financial perspective, to show the risk faced by the
investors. The challenge of matching the time profile of debt and generated cashflow is
presented, followed by the identification of the major sources of capital and the constraints
they impose in shaping the deals. The section ends with a presentation of local capital
markets that highlights their importance for infrastructure privatization programs.
Finally, the third section addresses risk. Risk is at the core of privatization
programs. With a wider participation of the private sector, some responsibilities are
redistributed and different parties face and bear different risk. The golden rule for risk
allocation is that the party best able to handle it, should bear it. Risks vary according to
type of project and sector; therefore, in order to apply the framework to the case study,
this section will concentrate on the case of highways. In the introduction of this section,
the principles of risk allocation are presented. Then, after a classification of country and
project risks, the most relevant issues are treated separately. This section is
complemented by a more detailed typology of risks presented in Annex 1.
2.1 WHAT DOES INFRASTRUCTURE PRIVATIZATION MEAN?
This section exposes the main definitions and issues of infrastructure provision
under privatization schemes. First, although infrastructure is easier to recognize than to
define, a definition will be attempted and the implication of its characteristics presented.
Second, three different models that analyze the government's procurement strategies are
exposed, highlighting the aspects that each of them stresses. In addition. each of the best
known contracting alternatives (e.g., BOT and BOO) is presented and mapped for each of
the models.
Third, the different parties involved are identified, and finally a fourth part is
included to introduce the concept of risk-return trade-off that characterizes private
investment decision making. This section is crucial for the policy design of privatization
programs, because it provides the grounds for the understanding of the importance and
consequences of risk allocation, which will be discussed in a later section. This part
allows policy makers to understand private's behavior and design policies that can add
benefits to all parties.
2.1.1 Defining Infrastructure
To better understand the uniqueness of infrastructure projects in the world of
investment opportunities, it is useful to model them according to five issues: long lives,
capital requirements, public nature of the good, usage, and immobility and indivisibility.
Long life is normally expected from any infrastructure project. Maintenance needs
to be performed periodically to increase the useful life of the facility. An airport, a road, a
dam or an electric power plant is expected to be in service for periods exceeding 20 or 30
years.
Infrastructure projects have high capital requirements, that need to be fulfilled
before their life-cycle starts. This means that before generating any revenue all investment
is spent. Annual revenues are low when compared to capital cost. In addition, investment
decisions are lumpy or subject to "technical indivisibility" (Hirschman, 1958). This implies
that an expansion of capacity needs to be large, in such a way that an important part of the
capacity is underutilized for a certain period of time. This characteristic is often referred
to as capitalness. One of the most important consequences of capitalness is the creation of
large economies of scale for the service provision, or the so called natural monopolies.
Publicness is related to the fact that many times the service provided by the facility
is considered to be a public good. A good is said to be public when it is impossible,
and/or undesirable to exclude people from its use (Stiglitz, 1988). In practice it is difficult
to find goods that strictly meet these two conditions. Although technological advances
are allowing the exclusion of free use of some facilities -- bringing closer some
infrastructure services to private goods, there still are some cases where, on economic
grounds -- i.e., efficiency, it would be undesirable to charge for the service -- e.g.,
uncongested roads -- or when administrative expenses of fare collection would outweigh
its benefits -- e.g., in some countries water supply is charged in a fixed sum, given that
setting and reading the water meters is extremely costly.
Infrastructure supports many economic activities, and the services provided (e.g.,
water, energy or even transport) are inputs for industries across all sectors. In one way or
another, these services are basic needs, or at least close substitutes. Finally, infrastructure
is normally highly immobile -- i.e., it is very costly to remove it as it normally is designed
to last for long periods of time -- and indivisible. Immobility varies according to the
specific project, with roads, airports or hydroelectric damns in one end; and some small
power generation plants or radars for aeronautical purposes closer to the other end. Site
specific facilities tend to be of three types: point (e.g. railway stations), band (e.g. a road)
and a combination of both which is called network infrastructure (e.g. electricity
distribution).
2.1.2 Spectrum for infrastructure provision
Governments have various ways to provide infrastructure, and many different
options to involve the private sector in this process. Three different frameworks for
analyzing infrastructure provision will be described. First, the Guislain-Kerf (1995)
analysis that exposes a continuum of options for private sector participation in the
provision of infrastructure services. Second, Miller's (1995) two dimensional approach
that emphasizes the integration of activities and sources of funding. Finally, the analysis
presented in the World Bank Report (1994), which focuses on the operation phase. Given
that these three frameworks address different aspects, they can be used simultaneously in
the analysis of infrastructure provision.
Guislain-Kerf (1995) model presents an spectrum of options for infrastructure
provision, according to the level of involvement of the private sector. The spectrum is
divided in three main blocks. The first, describes contract opportunities where the private
sector is not directly involved with the service provision (Figure 2.1). Typically, the
contracts are short-termed and the involvement of the private sector is the lowest of the
three blocks. Billing, parts' supply, construction works and maintenance are among the
activities undertaken under these options.
Figure 2.1 Range of Infrastructure Provision Options
Public 1 Private
Source: Guislain and Kerf, 1995.
The second and the third groups correspond to concession-type schemes, where
the return of the contractor is linked to performance. Leasing or Affermage, and Build-
Operate-Transfer - BOT - contracts conform the second group, in which the main
characteristic is that governments keep the ownership or control over the facility. The
main difference between the two, is that BOTs include the construction and the financing
i
of the facility. A third possibility of this group that is not mentioned in the model is
Renovate-Operate-Transfer - ROP, which is a hybrid of the affermage and the BOT. It is
in this group where the Colombian road privatization program stands. Finally, the third
group is characterized by the private ownership of the infrastructure facility. Build-
Operate-Own - BOO - contracts are very similar to BOTs, while Divestiture by License
target existing -- like leasing facilities.
Miller's model (1995) provides a framework for analysis of the government's
infrastructure procurement strategy. The strategy has two dimensions (Figure 2.2). The
vertical axis represents the government's participation type, direct or indirect. Funding
from government's budget is a direct participation, while the use of for example,
incentives or legislation to attract the private sector is considered indirect. The horizontal
axis is related to the bundling of the activities required for the completion of the project
(i.e., planning, design, construction, operation and/or maintenance). Two options are
available, either separating the activities to create a Segmented procurement process, or to
award all the activities in the same package (System).
Using Miller's framework, the top part of the figure corresponds to projects
directly funded by the government. Quadrant IV includes the cases like when the design is
contracted separately and to different firms from the construction work. Quadrant I
integrates further the activities, like for example in a Design-Build and Operate contract -
DBO. The bottom accounts for the projects with a wider participation of the private
sector, particularly as source of funding. Depending on the level of integration of the
activities, projects can be situated in either quadrant II or III. Contracts can take different
forms, of which the more commons are BOT, BOO, BLT and ROT. This kind of
contracts requires a long and complex process of project preparation and negotiations,
when compared to traditional tendering3.
3 By traditional tendering is understood a bidding process where firms are only competing for
construction of the facility, and the financing is provided by the government.
Figure 2.2 Miller's Procurement Analysis Model
Direct
IV
Segmented
III
System
II
Indirect
Source: Miller, 1995
Finally, The World Bank (1994) proposes a different classification that emphasizes
more the operation. It defines four different options for infrastructure ownership and
provision. The first option is public ownership and operation by a governmental agency.
To this category belong the parastatal monopolies that were common in developing
countries for infrastructure provision. The second option is public ownership with private
operation. This option is used when for strategic reasons or natural monopoly
characteristics, the government wants to maintain the control of the existing or new
facility. Water supply, railroads or roads are typical cases of this scheme, where the
private party normally assumes the commercial risk of operation, and shares with the
government the risk of investment. The third option, private ownership and operation, is
best suited for situations were the service can be provided competitively (e.g., some
telecommunication services). In this case, the private sector assumes both the commercial
risk of operation and the investment risk. Finally, community and user provision can be
used for local and small-scale services.
2.1.3 The Actors
Identifying all the parties is important to understand the relations that arise in
privatization programs. From a policy making perspective, being aware of the different
actors, their roles, responsibilities and interests is crucial to implement win-win schemes.
Failing to understand the inter-relation between parties may result in the design of
oversimplistic policies, or policies with the wrong incentives that may lead the process to
failure. When schemes are changed, new issues arise, procedures are defined and parties
have to get used to them. The main changes resulting from shifting away from traditional
tendering will be discussed after identifying the parties.
The main parties involved are the host government, the concessionaire, the
construction firms or the equipment providers, the fund providers and the users of the
services. Sometimes one person or firm belongs to more than one group.
There are different dimensions of the host government. The most obvious,
corresponds to the geographic area where the project will be constructed, or where the
services will be provided. Another dimension is that of the granting authority. Even if
there is a single granting authority, the picture can be confusing as many agencies -- often
with conflicting objectives -- make part of the project in one way or another. For instance,
the roles of the granting authority and the environmental agency are in conflict, in the
sense that the former's objective is the facility construction, while the latter must issue
licenses to allow the project to be undertaken.
The second main actor is the private concessionaire or sponsor. In some cases the
private party is the actual owner of the pruoject, in other cases the host government
maintains the ownership of the assets. The activities of the concessionaire vary according
to the kind of contract, but they may include financing, designing, constructing and
operating the project. The sponsor is normally a consortium formed by a number of
investors that are willing to share the risk of the venture, and that can be as diverse as
construction firms, financial institutions, or any individual shareholder (see Channel Tunnel
Case - Box 2.1). As investors, they are interested in the return they can get from the
project.
The case of construction firms is somehow mixed, as their participation as equity
holders may respond to different circumstances. It can be a way of securing their
participation in the construction of the facility, which is ultimately their line of expertise
and business, or it may be a requirement of the other actors, as an incentive mechanism to
make sure that the firm will do its best as it has a stake in the project.
Funds may come from different sources, mainly equity, debt and grants. Although
they all benefit from the success of the project, each group is involved differently. Equity
holders have already been discussed. Debt providers, could be divided into commercial
banks and bond holders. Bond holders are investors, but they will not share the upside
opportunities of the project, however if the sponsor bankrupts they can loose their
investment. Commercial banks provide a large part of the resources and their
participation is in their main line of business.
Finally, the users -- not normally considered a crucial party during the preparation
of the project, have their interests represented by the host government.
To illustrate the changing relations between the parties, a rough comparison
between a traditional tendering process and a BOT project is useful. For the former, the
government organizes a bidding process, from which one firm is selected to construct the
facility, and the funds are provided by the government according to a set of rules fixed in
the contract. The rules can vary widely according to the specific contract ranging from
fixed price to unit prices contracts. It is common to include a draft copy of the contract in
the bidding documents, in such a way that when the contract is awarded there is no much
room for negotiation.
BOX 2.1 THE CHANNEL TUNNEL.
"The tunnel is one: of the great things we can do together" Napoleon M (1856).
'Tell the French engineer that if he can accomplish it I will give him my blessing in my
own nameland in the.name of all the ladies in England" Queen Victoria (1856).
"What! Yo• ask us to contribute to a work the object of which is to shorten a distance
wealrek-find too short" Lord Palinerston (1856).
The Midn of a" fi•d• i b .twiee England sandv ral e can bes •tr ce  at least ten1856, as t
project of NapolHeon nmc. c nseveral schemes ve been proposed but never
undertaken. Finaly in 1985 the French and Brit6sh governments invited proposals firm
the privte sect or the ostruction, financing and operating the project (without any
goverient subses). T i isign was awarded to a FrenchBritish firm. Five importai
British and "F.. .....s(aq~.. te Nationale de Paris",•Crldit Lyonnais, Banque Indosu•e
Nationit Westistei and•.dland), and 10 coistrýuction companies made part of tbe
initia consortiniowner ora 55 year concession. The Cost of the project it that ti&
was ted na nd 5billion. In addition to cover exchange rate risk, £ 1 billion
fai pea vetment Bank was created.
Fused e anddebt Equity wa panedto be raised in three installments
trenche (EquityKZ~ and III) Debt was in the form of a syndicated loan, where moi
o,, so would be confidence from the banks that the project wo
be d On the other hand, the fact thatloans were signed before th
posund i:tat waiaiBe The followingx month. October 86, a further £ 206 :million .
shares We sol (1 ity W. However, the important part of the financing came in 19SiT
when lioof syndicated loan was arranged, and £770 million from Equity were
raised. he fc that Equity was in the market jist two weeks aftr Black onda
when t sock arket crshed in October 1987, gave confidence about the project. Th
loan r ed 2 of the credit as a provisionforcost overruns orunexpected high
Soon after the project started, the consortium realized :that the construction costs we
hix (in 99 it was estimatedr a%increase from 19
esoitions were too favorable fothe contractors ftheL.
consortsu needed'to increase their debt, but banks were reluctant even to let them e d
the already approved £5 billion, until the contract was renegtiated (".. to ensre a
equable ditribution of the cost overruns between the acompany and its contractors." The
i 3
In February 22, 1990, the new contract with TML was signed,
e tbanksstari~ct.d
£4miilioni
£·'j 566u:-·:5·~i-··lion ~ :~?
£6$Omi: ::ion:
.. ~:L6':;ii-- ,m iiflon:~:i~:i-  lj.i::
However, under concession contracts (e.g., Build, Operate and Transfer - BOT)
there are at least three sets of negotiations. The first negotiation is the creation of the firm
that will be the "owner of the project" during the period of concession, referred to as the
i:: ::
·` ·*i:::
: .r
:·:i:li::, ;:.-.-:- :~ .--- _: ::::I::.
::::':: -. :- :·:::--;:-
.::::: ,.a
ii:i::-:::::I::-:_  :: ·::i:-: :::::-:~;::
sponsor. The rules and the responsibilities of each of the consortium firms are set,
particularly those regarding risk allocation.
At the end of the bidding process, negotiations between the sponsor and the host
government start, in a similar fashion to that of the traditional tendering. In the final stage
sponsor and lenders, start the negotiations that lead to the financial closure. This includes
the agreements over the conditions of the loans, and a number of conditionalities and
structures designed to protect the interests of the parties (e.g., priority of claim in case of
bankruptcy, or rules about supplementary fund raising).
Because of the multiplicity of parties involved in the development of the project,
the structure of the resulting deals is very complex (Figure 2.3) and time consuming -- the
Hub power project in PaKistan may be an extreme example but it shows how time
consuming these processes are: it took 8 years to prepare. In order to provide security to
the lenders, complicated contractual structures are developed, even when government
involvement is marginal, as in the case in the Mamonal Power Plant in Colombia (Box
2.2). In the case of the channel tunnel, the syndicate of banks was up to 200, and at least
80% of them had to approve any fund raising.
Figure 2.3 Structure of Relations in BOT Schemes
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2.1.4 Risk-return tradeoff and its relevance for infrastructure privatization
Any private party willing to take part of the project has to evaluate it in order
decide whether or not to participate. A central issue in their assessment is the exposure to
risk, and the expected return. This section provides the theoretical framework to
understand the fundamental trade-off that firms face during the decision making process,
and the implications for infrastructure privatization. For the Colombian analysis this
concept will be repeatedly used.
At risk capital, or the recognition of a trade-off between risk and return, is the
foundation of modem corporate finance. As a condition for markets to be efficient,
different returns can only be understood in terms of risk. Otherwise, the rational investor
would rush to invest in opportunities with the highest return, pushing up prices until
returns for all investments are equal. In this context, risk is explained as the variance from
and the correlation of an asset with the overall market behavior. In other words, it is not
enough to understand the fluctuations around the market, it is important to see if they
move in the same or in opposite directions (e.g. when there is a recession, shares of some
industries go down while others go up) and their magnitude. This can be seen as an
elasticity of the asset with respect to market behavior.
For example, in the stock market, the way the model works is based on historical
data of the market and each of the stocks. For operational reasons, the market's behavior
can be based on the performance of only a specific set of shares, like the S&P 500 -- an
index that includes 500 stocks published by Standards and Poors. The Capital Asset
Pricing Model - CAPM - is an investment tool that recognizes this trade-off. and provides
a useful guide to all kinds of investors (i.e. from highly risk averse to risk pro) to decide
about the composition of their own portfolio.
With this theory in mind, the next stage is to understand its consequences for
infrastructure provision under privatization schemes. The first thing that must be brought
to attention is that the theory assumes full information, and that there are many
participants that share it. This might not be the case for infrastructure projects, as
commonly there are few participants and the information or knowledge of the project can
vary. In this way risk can be perceived differently by each of the parties. From a policy
maker viewpoint, it is important to understand that risk is perceived and that it varies
across potential bidders.
The main implication of the theory, is that it provides grounds for an active
participation of the host government in evaluating which actions can be taken to reduce
the overall risk of the project, so that investors would require a lower rate of return.
Actions can take the form of information provision and risk allocation rules. For the
former, the decisions may include showing its commitment with the process, gathering and
releasing as much information about the project as possible, being aware of the importance
of demonstration effect (positive or negative) in the future development of the program,
creating an overall environment of transparency for the bidding process, and being
extremely careful in the preparation of the bidding documents. As it will be shown, the
quality of the bidding documents is a major concern for the Colombian case. One of the
main aspects in this case is the credibility of the host government and its agencies;
therefore information release with a signaling effect can be used as a way of reducing
uncertainty. The latter, defining clear and sound risk allocation rules will be addressed in a
later section.
2.2 FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
One of the key areas in which governments wants the private sector to be involved
is the financing of the projects. The main reason is the additional investment resources
that will generate infrastructure services that otherwise would be delayed. Therefore,
policy makers must be aware and understand the main issues of the financial aspects of
privatizing infrastructure, to be able to design adequate policies, responsive to the private
needs.
This section presents the main issues around the financing of infrastructure. The
first part, re-interprets the characteristics of infrastructure from a financial perspective.
This perspective is introduced to show the sources of risk of infrastructure ventures, and
some of the key concerns of fund providers. Matching the time profiles of debt and
income produced by the facility is one of the main challenges for the infrastructure sector
with privatization. This issue is presented in the second part. Thirdly, the main sources of
capital for financing the projects are identified and described, highlighting the chief
constraints and potentials of each of the sources. An application of how sources respond
to risk profile and the amoant of capital required according to the phases of the project is
presented.
Finally, the fourth part explains the role that local capital markets can play in
infrastructure privatization. In addition, it presents the main problems that developing
countries face for their development.
2.2.1 Why infrastructure is financially risky?
The importance of recognizing the financial risk in infrastructure venture is to be
able to understand which are the stakes at play, and how the parties will interrelate to
shape the deals. Restating the characteristics of infrastructure, six main aspects explain
why infrastructure venttres are in essence risky (Chandavarkar 1994 and IFC, 1994).
First, capital costs are high when compared to the maintenance and operation
requirements. Second, infrastructure projects require large, lumpy amounts of capital,
therefore considerable sunk costs exist because income cannot be realized until projects
become operational. Third, entry and exit are very costly, reducing the contestability of
the services; or similarly, these projects are difficult to trade. Fourth, debt maturities tend
to be long, and debt-equity ratios are high. Fifth, the tariffs of the services are subject to
political pressures, and therefore the private parties fear changes that alter their
profitability. Finally, the income generated by the services is normally in local currency,
increasing risks related with the fluctuation of foreign exchange rates.
These characteristics stand as evidence of the importance of the role played by the
lenders in shaping the structure of the projects. First, as debt-equity ratios are high,
lenders are more exposed to risk than in other kind of projects. In the experience of the
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group - IFC, a greenfield project
requires over 2/3 to come from debt. Although debt always accounts for a large part of
the financing, it varies across sectors. For instance, in a sample of projects in which the
IFC has been involved, power projects require lager debt-equity ratios (68-32) than
telecommunication ones (50-50) (IFC, 94). Second, as debt is so high, the project loans
are not based on the equity of the sponsor, but rather on the cashflow generated by the
project during its operating life. In other words, debt repayment depends solely on the
cashflow that can be generated by the operation of the project, instead of the equity of the
sponsor. In project finance jargon, this is known as non-recourse, limited recourse or off-
balance sheet financing. Third, because of intensive capital requirements, an infrastructure
project might be the single project that has the largest loan, and therefore lenders have the
incentive of a heavy involvement, and of taking part in some decisions.
2.2.2 Matching funding and project flows
Although the basis for understanding this issue has already been stated, the
constraints it imposes and the risks created, makes it worth to be mentioned under a
different heading. Matching funding is one of the main challenges for infrastructure
privatization in developing countries. The main constraint is that while concession periods
can easily exceed 10 or 15 years, debt is available for much shorter periods of time.
Therefore, it is necessary to use funds with different time profiles than the income
generated, and refinancing of the initial debt is required. Refinancing generates risk as the
future market conditions are uncertain, particularly when debt re-issuing takes place.
An interesting example is Serial Bonds, which are bonds that have to be re-issued
several times before their final maturity, constrained by the capital market's characteristics
(see Hungary M1-M15 toll road case - Box 2.3).
A potential problem that arises from the inability of matching funds is a liquidity
crisis of the sponsor, which will be treated in more detail when analyzing the Colombian
case.
2.2.3 Sources of funding
There are several sources of funding, each offering different opportunities and
imposing different constraints on the projects: equity from the sponsor, debt and grants.
The importance of each of them depends on the individual characteristics of the project
and the financial instruments available.
Direct Grants are not always available in the financing of the works. Sometimes
they are disguised by the provision of other works that will support the success of the
project. Another mechanism through which grants are given is through interest-free or
subsidized interest government loans. like in the Sydney Harbor Tunnel, for which the
government made a non-indexed (for inflation), interest free loan for A$250 million.
Serial bonds with initial maturity of 2 years, and then according to market. Final maturity 2008.
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There are different ways of raising equity5, which can be used according to the
amount required. The sponsor or concessionaire can be a private company that raises
capital through its owners. Alternatively, the sponsor could be a public firm6 executing
public share placements in the market to raise equity funds. In recent years, the
development of private Infrastructure Funds has been a way of raising equity from abroad.
In many cases, these funds are temporary, while the facility is under their ownership.
Most of the existent Funds are either sector or region specific, and a few of them are both.
Examples are the Asian Infrastructure Fund, Scudder Latin American Trust for
Independent Power and Central Europe Telecom Investment.
Similarly, debt can be raised from a variety of instruments, for example: direct or
syndicated loans from commercial banks or investment banks, loans from suppliers, loans
from multilateral agencies, loans from export-import banks (EXIM), bonds, serial bonds
and public infrastructure funds among others. Not all instruments are always available,
nor are the available instruments always used.
An interesting implication of the matching between source of funds, risk and
capital required is observed in the evolution of the project. Three different phases can be
linked to different kinds of financing needs (IFC, 94):
1. Development phase. Very high risk. Firms might not be selected in the bidding
process, or be able to mobilize financing after being awarded the contract. Therefore this
phase is normally financed through equity. Low levels of resources are required.
s Equity holders share the benefits from the project, meaning that their return is not fixed as in a
bond, and that if the project goes well they can get a large return, but if the project goes bankrupt, they
will be paid after all debtors, according to the claim priority of their shares (i.e. preferred or common
equity).
6 In this case, the term public is related to the way the shares are traded, and does not mean a firm
owned by the government. A firm is called public when has listed its shares in some stock market, so they
can be traded publicly.
2. Construction phase. High risk. Many sources of risk. Requires a high level of
resources, therefore equity is not normally enough. A combination of subordinated debt,
senior debt and guarantees is commonly used.
3. Operation phase. Lower risk. If the repayment schedule in the financial
structure does not match with project cashflow, then refinancing through bond emissions
might be possible.
2.2.4 The Role of Local Capital Markets
As shown above, there are many different instruments used to raise funds, most of
them from capital markets7. This highlights the crucial role that capital markets play, or
should play, in supporting the development of infrastructure privatization programs.
Risk is a key issue when understanding investments and capital markets. At risk
capital, or the recognition of a trade-off between risk and return, explains why there are
different returns available in the market for securities with the same maturity. Capital
markets should therefore offer a variety of investment opportunities that suit the risk
profile and the time horizon of potential investors.
Local capital markets in developing countries are not mature enough to facilitate
the financing of infrastructure projects. They are deficient in two different aspects: first,
capital markets are small with respect to the level of investment required, and second,
there is no long-term market established. There are several reasons why such long-term
markets do not exists (in Latin America "most loans and securities having a 90- to 180-
day maturity" -Holden, 1995), like high and uncertain inflation, exchange rate risk, and
political uncertainty among others. In addition, in developing economies, the capital
requirements of infrastructure projects can be higher than the market can handle, if
investors were to diversify their portfolios to mitigate risk.
7 Capital markets are composed by the money market, bond market and stock exchai,ge.
It is fair to ask therefore, what can be the role of local capital markets, and what is
the importance of their development, especially when well developed international capital
markets exist and have the characteristics required. There are at least three good reasons
that explain it. The first one is rather straightforward and refers to the fact that by having
access to a new local well functioning market, countries not only increase the pool of
resources available but find them at home. Secondly, it is reasonable to assume that
foreign investors will normally demand a higher return than local ones, otherwise there
would be no reason for them to invest abroad, where necessarily they won't have as much
information to react fast enough in adverse situations. Furthermore, relying only on
foreign funds will increase the cost of capital.
Thirdly, it is important to realize that with the private involvement in financing
infrastructure, the resources raised in capital markets from bonds or share emissions are
publicly traded in the stock. When these securities are held by foreign investors, the
resources are classified as short-term foreign funds. This is because the owner can easily
get rid of them only by phoning the trader, and then take the money out of the country.
This is what happened in Mexico, where in a few days a substantial amount of resources
left the country. Heavily relying in short-term foreign funds is not desirable, as they can
move easily and just a rumor can rush the investors to leave. This can lead to a deficit in
the capital account, contracting the county's foreign reserves, or in extreme cases to a
capital account crisis. This last issue is specially relevant for infrastructure given the large
amounts of resources involved.
Another way to see the potential of local capital markets (even if it might not be a
causal relation), is a finding by the International Finance Corporation - !FC - of a positive
relation between the level of development of local capital markets and programs in
infrastructure concessions.
It is important to point out that although infrastructure privatization programs are
not the driving force behind the local capital markets development, they can benefit greatly
from a well functioning one. Countries have to undertake different kinds of measures to
achieve this objective. For instance, to facilitate the demand of long-term securities,
governments have to undertake social reforms, particularly in the labor market. The
resulting pension funds have a fairly precise idea of when their obligations have to be met.
Given the essence of their business, a substantial part of their obligations are in the long-
run.
It is important as well to have many players, either buying and issuing securities, to
guarantee that none of them has market power. To ensure this, governments have to
design a tax regulation that does not penalize saving through investing in companies, to
encourage more people zo participate. In order to motivate the companies to issue stock,
governments can reduce the level of "absolute ownership", so that the original owners can
keep total control of the company with a lower share.
2.3 ALLOCATING AND MANAGING RISK
"The most significant characteristic of project finance is
the art of minimizing and apportioning risk among the
various participants" (Traverso)
Risk always exists when undertaking any sort of project, however it varies from
project to project and from sector to sector. For infrastructure privatization, where
projects are normally large and complex, risk plays a central role. Little can be done about
risks, however the task of allocating them properly reduces the overall risk of the proiect
(Beidleman et al, 1990). Therefore, although the principles are always the same, this
chapter concentrates on the highway case.
The main issues should be considered when analyzing risk are: first, the level of
riskiness of each of the potential sources of risk. This step is important because it allows
the participants to direct their effort, and spend more time in the critical cases. As risk
varies across projects and sectors, this exercise should be made in a case by case fashion.
Second, identification of the party that is in the best position to handle each of the risks.
Finally, risks should be "allocated, priced or mitigated between the parties" (IFC, 94).
Three further considerations must be highlighted. Risks should be faced from the
beginning, risk is perceived differently by each party, and there are grounds for policy
makers' intervention. The importance of identifying and allocating the risks from the
beginning should be clear, otherwise if a risk that has not been properly allocated increases
the exposure of the private participant, it will be reflected one way or another in the price
of the project -- e.g., via toll level or concession length. If, on the other hand, the risk was
not previously identified, it is a potential source of future conflict. The potential of future
conflict is one of the issues that is presented more extensively in the Colombian case.
Policy makers have three main ways to intervene. First, they can create an
enabling environment. In many cases actions are taken outside the field of infrastructure
and therefore little can be done by sectorial policy makers. The second way is through the
provision of information to reduce part of the uncertainty of the potential investors.
Finally, by deciding when the government should award a guarantee in order to attract
investors that otherwise would not be interested. In both cases, credibility is an asset for
the host government as it reduces the risk perceived by the privates lowering their
expected return.
In sum, the "golden rule" of risk allocation is that the party that is best able to
manage a particular risk, should bear it. The chosen party can benefit from good
management and, will lose from mismanagement. For example, risks that are commercial
in nature should be borne by the private sector. The way risk is allocated is through
contractual agreements, that range from the inclusion of a clause in the main contract, to
the use of third parties that manage cashflows with clear rules for distribution of income
(see Colombia Mamonal Case - Box 2.2). It is common to construct a matrix for risk
allocation indicating the participants and the kind of risks included (Table 2.1).
There are several sources of risk, which are commonly divided in two groups:
country risk and project risk. The most important considerations will be treated in more
detail, however a more complete inventory of risk and its analysis is presented in Annex 1.
Table 2.1 Typical Allocation of Risks among Participants.
Type of Risk Deve- Contrac- Resource Lenders Suppliers Consumers Financial Gov't Others
lopers tors Owners Advisors Bodie (1)
s
Technology X
Credit X X X X
Bid X X
Completion X X
Cost Overrun X X
Performance X X X
Political X X X X X
Liability X X
Equity X X X
Resale
Off-take X X
(1): International Finance Corporation (IFC), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Insurance Companies
and Third Party Investors.
Source: Extracted from "On Allocating Risk: The Essence of Project Finance". (Beidleman et al . 1990)
2.3.1 Country Risk
Country risk takes into consideration variables that affect the project but that do
not depend at all on the concessionaire's performance, and that normally can be influenced
by governmental policies. Country risk can be further subdivided in two groups: political
or regulatory (e.g., political instability, expropriation, new legislation) and economic,
commercial or market (e.g. inflation, exchange rates, demand fluctuations).
Credibility at all levels is a key issue. At the country's level, it is important for the
concessionaire to be aware of macroeconomic stability, currency availability and
convertibility. The concessionaire's perception is significant given that it will determine
their willingness to assume some risks, that may otherwise be viewed as government's
responsibility.
In general, country issues are not the most relevant for the Colombian case as it
will be shown in the next chapter. The following are examples of what are considered to
be the main sources of country risk that may have substantial impact in privatization
projects.
Inflation
Inflation is a commercial risk. In countries were inflation is low or with little
volatility, the private sector may be willing to bear this risk. However, in the developing
world, where inflation records may not be so good, and where some countries have gone
through periods of hyperinflation, governments are willing to index tolls through the
contracts, in such a way that the private party can update the tolls without going through
bureaucratic processes. Because of the close relation between fiscal policy and inflation,
the government plays an active role in inflation , and therefore it is common to index tolls.
Not providing such a clause could imply a substantial increase in the return demanded by
the private sector, and a decrease of potential investors.
Two main problems are related to inflation in privatization programs. In both
cases lenders play a major role. The first case, corresponds to the ability of indexing tolls
to ensure that the concessionaire will be in a position to payback the debt -- loans or
securities. If tolls are not indexed, lenders may consider that the project is too risky and
may be reluctant to provide resources. This is particularly relevant because of the long
term nature of the projects. The second problem is related to the uncertainty of the cost of
the project -- in nominal terms -- caused by inflation. For this kind of risk the
concessionaire is not covered -- except for additional work, but because the expected
relatively short construction period, lenders may create provisions within their credit lines
(see Channel Tunnel case - Box 2.1).
Foreign Exchange or Currency Devaluation
This risk is of considerable importance for developing countries as it has been
suggested to restraint long-term foreign investment. In the case of Mexico, the toll was
pegged only to inflation and was not tied to currency fluctuations. January 1995's
happenings in this country might remind foreign investors to be more careful about their
exposure to those long-term risks, or to include higher risk premium in future contracts.
Apart from pegging tariffs to devaluation, it is possible to hedge against this kind
of risks with the use of financial instruments, such as swaps or options. However, they
might not exist for the country's currency and if they do, the maturities available can be
too short (less than 2 years). In general, normal fluctuations of the currency are in nature
commercial risks and therefore should be borne by the private sector. If the private sector
is concerned about large differences between depreciation and inflation because of
exogenous shocks, a clause fixing a maximum difference could be established.
Government and concessionaire must agree on this value, which will reflect a maximum
level of commercial risk the private sector is ready to bear for totally unforeseen
situations. Whenever the difference is larger than the agreed value, one of the parties
(private sector or host government) will be compensated. There are still two great
difficulties to be solved. One, regarding the fact that fixing the value might be difficult,
especially given that the private sector would have interest in setting it as low as possible,
when in fact it should be relatively high, as it should reflect only rare exogenous events
and not normal fluctuations. The second, is related with foreign investment being in
different currencies that can fluctuate with respect to each other, making more difficult to
workout a compensation formula. Given the unpredictability of exchange rate variations,
and the cost of time delays, standby credit facilities to the sponsor can be used to ensure
that capital shortage will not occur during construction, avoiding some disruptions.
A similar instrument to the proposed here was used in the Malaysia's North-South
highway, the government accepted to back the risk if exchange rates dropped more than
15% of the initial ones (Walker and Smith, 1995). Other mechanisms can be used, and
vary according to the facility and circumstances. For instance, in energy it is common to
index part of the tariff to foreign currency.
Foreign currency availability and convertibility
In an ideal situation a country should have a sound economic environment and no
past record of foreign currency availability and convertibility problems. However, when
this is not possible, credibility and confidence can be provided by using other mechanisms.
Strong commitment with the process or including the Ministry of Finance as part of the
contract are options that the country can use to reduce this kind of risk. The contracts can
contain clauses that determine solution mechanisms where the concessionaire can be
directly involved with the Ministry of Finance, avoiding bureaucratic and inefficient
intermediation of other agencies -- i.e., Ministry of Public Works, or the agency in charge
of the concession.
Political and Regulatory Risk
Change in policies can affect greatly the performance of a project, particularly
when the contracts are awarded for long periods of time. New legislation that alters the
projected cashflow (e.g., tax reforms) -- which is the base of the agreement -- are feared.
Extreme cases like expropriation are cause of concern for concessionaires, particularly in
countries where this practice has taken place. If governments want to attract foreign
investors, they should evaluate carefully their situation with respect to this issues and take
corrective actions.
Risk from new legislation or changes in government policy that alter the
profitability of the deal, must be faced during the negotiation, in order to define which
changes are acceptable, and the appropriate mechanism of compensation. The direct
involvement of the Ministry of Finance in the contract, can provide great credibility when
any unexpected situation of payments to the concessionaire arises. Its participation can
help as it reduces the risk of delays in the payments, because less bureaucratic procedures
may be required.
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Regarding expropriation, concessionaires can get an insurance from MIGA 8, but at
a cost, which will depend on the country's record, and can be insufficient for large
projects. Alternatively, the government can establish a standby credit that would pay
immediately the concessionaire, whenever the eventuality happened. This kind of
instrument can be managed by an international agency, like for example the World Bank.
Governments might find the insurance more appealing, given that a standby credit might
require debate in Congress and might reduce the credit availability for other kind of
investment. However as pointed out, the insurance might not be suitable for the project.
Dispute Resolution System
Coming to an agreement over the way each kind of dispute will be handled and
defining clear procedures will avoid costly and unnecessary delays. The dispute resolution
system poses a main concern for foreign participants. They may be unfamiliar with the
local legal system, and fear an unfair trial. Therefore, it has become common to ask for
internationally accepted dispute resolution proceedings. However, not every dispute is
worth taking to court, so the contract should include very clear procedures to solve
conflicts, like for instance setting a committee representing both parties, clearly indicating
deadlines and making sure that the result is binding. A further option is a third party
binding arbitration.
Demand
Although demand is of commercial nature, the risk associated may be too large for
the private sector to bear. In such cases the government may decide to share the risk.
Important decisions must be made to assess whether or not and to which extent the
government should award a demand guarantee. In principle, the private sector could bear
this risk but the return demanded could be too high -- because of increased risk, to a point
where it would be better for the government to provide the facilities. The increased risk
8 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which is part of the World Bank Group.
would reduce the pool of potential investors, and if the increase is too large no investors
may be willing to participate.
An important consideration, is that in the absence of the private sector, the
government would become the sole bearer of this risk -- through reduced economic
benefits of lower than expected traffic. Built-in incentives for concessionaire's
performance during operation should be included if the government decides to award the
guarantee.
It is noteworthy that during the decision period, demand is based on the traffic
projections, therefore special attention should be dedicated to their preparation.
2.3.2 Project Risk.
Project risk can be subdivided into three parts according to the project's phases:
planning or preparation, construction and operation. The main issues during the
planning/preparation phase are related to the design and the changes that might occur, the
risk associated with the technology chosen, license procurement -- particularly for
environmental permits and bid awarding. During the construction phase, the issues are
more diverse, including the completion of the works on time and budget, how to define
and solve force majeure events, land acquisition provisions and mechanisms, damage or
injury to third parties, unforeseen ground conditions or subcontracting failures among
others.
During the operation phase, it is important to try to foresee events that can change
or alter the expected project's performance. This includes iss"es like how to deal with
competing roads, what to do when any other work affects the concession's level of service
-- e.g., the construction of a railroad crossing, how to deal with accidents on the road --
and particularly when there is a blockage of the road, or time overruns in maintenance
works -- specially if it affects the level of service. Finally, there are issues that can arise at
any time during the project's life such as insolvency of any of the firms constituting the
concessionaire, or a misunderstanding of what each party is entitled to when signing the
contract -- Lhis is specially relevant for foreign investors that are used to different legal
systems and practices. The following are examples of what are considered to be the main
sources of project risk that may have substantial impact in privatization projects.
2.3.2.1 Planning and Preparation Phase
Bid Risk and Competition
The Bid risk is related to the risk of not having awarded the project. This risk is
resolved early in the project and is expected to be borne exclusively by the concessionaire.
However, there are exceptions like the Channel Tunnel project where, because the high
cost of preparing the bids, the governments paid a fixed sum to the parties who classified
after a certain round. However, the most common practice is for the concessionaire to
bear all the risk. Normally, this phase is funded solely with equity.
The lack of transparency in the bidding process increases the competition risk.
Knowledge of the Project
The previous knowledge is an issue that will prove important as evidenced by the
Mexican and the Colombian case. It is desirable for the concessionaire to acquire a good
knowledge of the project beforehand. The benefits of this should be reflected in the bids
because the better the knowledge about the project the concessionaire has, the lower the
uncertainty he faces. Therefore, the concessionaii, w.ill be in a better position to mai,±.ge
and foresee the potential risks, and consequently to define its risk premium. This in itself
is not a source of risk, but of uncertainty. The uncertainty caused by the lack of
knowledge makes the task of assessing risk difficult.
Good and unambiguous bidding documents are essential if the project is to be
successful. For its preparation, it is very important to take advantage of the international
experience and knowledge -- of the way potential international bidders make business --
that the major investment banks have. Governments can decide to work in two different
ways. They can have very elaborate and definitive bidding documents, relying on high
quality studies (e.g. traffic forecast), or they can prepare a looser set of pre-bidding
documents, and after a first selection, chosen bidders and governments work together to
prepare the final bidding documents, like was the case in Argentina. This last scheme is
particularly suitable for encouraging and facilitating the gathering of potential bidders to
discuss the project and the contract in order to take their views into account. It may be
desirable to create a pool of potential bidders9 in charge of overseeing parts that have to
be fine tuned, like some parts of the design or traffic projections. However, the main
drawback of this solution is its high cost for the private parties.
Technology
If governments want to reduce uncertainty during the development of the project,
it is advisable to open bids for projects that require proven technology, that is, where both
the concessionaire and the government have previous experience. In addition,
governments should focus on "good projects", that have strong cash flows, to allow the
concessionaires to have a fair return, and meet their financial obligations.
License Procurement Risk
License procurement is a difficult activity for risk allocation as its development
depends on the performance of both parties: concessionaire's effort in preparing the
required documentation and government efficiency and coordination. In this case, the risk
should be allocated in a case by case basis, depending on which of the two aspects is more
critical. It is very possible, and not desired that the final outcome would be that of shared
9 The bidding process can consist of two rounds, where prequalified and really interested
candidates move to the final round.
responsibility. This situation is not desired because of the difficulty of determining who is
accountable in conflicting situations.
2.3.2.2 Construction Phase
Sponsor's Performance and Completion Risks
In principle, the contract has built-in incentives to punish the concessionaire for a
poor management, and reward it from good performances. In this sense, the
concessionaire will assume the risks of its own performance. One of the most common
ways of providing punishment is through insurance policies issued to the government, to
be made effective in case standards are not delivered. For the case of completion on time,
it is common to charge penalties for delays and to award efficiency bonuses for works
finished before the scheduled date.
Cost overruns
Cost overruns are commercial in nature if additional work is not required.
Therefore they must be borne by the concessionaire. A solution is the use of fixed-price
or turnkey contracts. However, the ability of firms to bear this risk for large projects
remains in question. Allocation rules sharing this risk are likely to be present in many
cases. The main problem with this issue is when governments open bidding processes
with a poor knowledge of the project, increasing largely the uncertainty of amount of
work required for the construction. A further consideration that is derived as well from a
lack of preparation is when governments request a change in the road alignment.
Land Acquisition
Land acquisition processes can take a long time and be difficult. Governments
might not have efficient procedures for buying land, or the resources might take long to be
paid for. In concession projects delays caused by a government's agency once the
contract has started can be very costly and sometimes difficult to solve. It is in the best
interest of governments to ensure that their land acquisition procedure is expeditious, and
to bear in mind that it might be subject to continuous adjustments. This should be a
concern for top officials and not only for lower operational tiers.
Subcontracting
Subcontracting is a responsibility of the concessionaire, therefore the risk
associated must be borne by the private party. If a subcontractor fails to deliver a work,
or delivers it at a higher cost than expected, then the concessionaire should always assume
the responsibility. Concessionaires could find mechanisms to translate this risk directly to
the subcontractors based on their performance -- like fixed-price contracts.
2.3.2.3 Operation Phase
Exit Option
Contracts should include exit options that allow ways of selling the project at any
time, as long as it is acceptable for the other party. This might be important in the event
that the concessionaire gets in financial difficulties, in which case the quality of the service
provided may be affected. The project can be sold at a discounted price to an interested
party, reducing the impact in the development of the project and the exposure of the firm.
It is important to assure that the government will require the same standards irrespective
of the party. Additionally, clear rules of when this would be allowed should be defined.
Maintenance -Standards and Costs
The concessionaire most be accountable for failing to deliver the agreed quality
standards or for delivering it at a higher cost. For the first case an operation agreement
must exist, stating clearly the minimum standards and the conseqoclaces of not complying,
which could include losing the toll revenue for a certain period of time, making effective
an insurance issued to the government, or in extreme cases, termination of the contract.
To avoid misuse of the mechanisms, they most be clearly defined in the contract.
III. THE PRACTICE
This chapter is an attempt to understand the Colombian toll road privatization
program using the theoretical framework developed in the previous section. It starts with
an overview of the world wide trend of the neo-liberal reforms undertaken by numerous
governments since the 1980s. Accepting that the general environment of the country is an
important factor for the success of any privatization process, the second part presents a
general overview of the current economic, political and legal environment of the country.
The third section concentrates specifically in the road concession program. A brief
description of the highway network is presented to introduce the main constraints and
challenges that the government faces, followed by the evolution of the road privatization
program. Through seven concession contracts and several informal interviews to the
main players, risk and other major elements are analyzed individually, to provide a picture
of how the theoretical principles have been translated to reality.
3.1 THE REFORMS: SHAPING THE STATE FOR PRIVATE PARTICIPATION
In line with the neo-liberal thought around the world, Colombia (Box 3.1) started
its restructuring by the end of the decade of the 1980s. Although public sector ownership
has been less predominant than in other Latin American countries, at that time the
government was highly protectionist (World Bank, 1994c). In 1990, the Barco
administration announced a plan to modernize the state, "Plan para la Modernizaci6n del
Estado", in which the core of the reforms was aimed at the liberalization of trade and the
improvement of transport infrastructure. Later in 1990, with the entrant Gaviria
administration, the plan was adopted and deepened in the scope of the trade liberalization
and the reform of the public sector (IMF, 1995). The aim of the reforms was to gain
efficiency in the goods, labor, foreign exchange and capital markets, as well as to promote
a higher participation of Colombia in international competition, provide an adequate
macroeconomic condition for an expected larger growth, and the creation of governmental
agencies that could respond to the future needs.
According to these guidelines and the new 1991 Constitution, the government
undertook several specific actions. In the external sector, two main areas related with
trade were active. First, a gradual reduction of tariff levels from 43% in 1989 to 15% in
1994 was accomplished. Second, several trade agreements were signed: with the Andean
countries, with Mexico and Venezuela (the G-3), with Chile, with the Caribbean
Community, and with Panama. Other major reforms that were undertaken during this
period include tax policy, particularly the regime for income and wealth taxation;
privatization of existing assets, service provision and construction of new infrastructure;
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social security reforms, with the creation of private pension funds: administrative
decentralization; financial sector reforms to promote competition and efficiency, including
the new role of the Central Bank as an agency relatively independent from the executive
branch; and even the agricultural sector was reformed.
With reference to the infrastructure sector this period has been very dynamic and
the regulatory framework has changed in all of its subsectors, and in accordance with the
new spirit, a much wider an active participation of the private sector has been included.
In the transportation sector, the public entities that managed the railroads and the
ports were liquidated with the intention of attracting private participation. In addition, the
Ministry of Public Works was restructured to strengthen its planning and regulatory
functions, acquiring the new name of Ministry of Transportation. Where lacking, special
legislation was passed to allow the participation of the private sector, according to the
new investment possibilities. Air industry had three main changes, the country was
moving towards an "open skies" policy, airport administration started decentralizing, and
private participation for the management and the construction was expected.
In the electric sector similar reforms were undertaken, particularly since 1992,
when a brownouto' sped up the process. In that year, private generators of their own
energy could sell their overcapacity to the system, and the free access to transmission and
distribution networks was declared. In 1994, a piece of legislation called the "Ley
Electrica" was passed, regulating and allowing the participation of private or public-
private partnerships in the generation of electricity. The "Ley El1ctrica" also established a
regulatory commission in charge of overseeing for monopolistic behavior and promoting
competition.
to Brownout corresponds to a situation when the electric generation cannot cope with the total
demand and it is necessary to cut supply during certain hours of the day. This measure is temporal, and
typically happens during unexpected intense drought periods in countries heavily dependent in
hydroelectricity.
Reforms in the telecommunication sector have been extensive. Local and national
long-distance services were moved from state monopoly to a concession regime in which
the private sector, either locals or foreigners, could participate. Later on 1993, the
international long distance service was opened to the private sector. The same year, the
cellular service was regulated and a bidding process was started, allowing the traditional
local telephone companies to create joint ventures with the private sector. The
government received more than US$ 1 billion from the cellular process (World Bank,
1994c). A regulatory commission, similar to the one in the electric sector was created.
Finally, in 1994 the Television Bill allowed the broadcasting of private channels.
According to the government's Development Plan 1995-1998, the main goals of
the participation of the private sector in the infrastructure sector are:
1. To increase efficiency in the operation and construction of the projects and services.
2. To have access to additional resources, in order to supply the needs in a shorter time
span.
3. To give priority to the social sector when assigning public funds.
4. To reduce the risks that the public sector was facing at the time".
5. To benefit from competition.
The privatization program for the period 1995-1998 aims to attract US$ 12,760
millions (Table 3.1).
•" This 1995 statement regards the fact that the new administration considers that before 1995, the
government was unnecessarily overexposed to risk.
Table 3.1 Infrastructure Privatization Program
Sector Kind of Projects Private Participation Total Cost
(US$ millions of 1994) (US$ millions of 1994)
Roads Construction and
Rehabilitation 2,041 2,346
Electric Generation 1,891 2,248
Gas Transportation and
D is....................................... ..trib u.tio n ................................. 4 9 9 49 9
Oil Transport,
Refinery and
Petrochemical 3,292 3,292
Telecom- Long-distance, Local,
munications Cellular, Value Added
Services, Television
and Post 1,595 4.375
TOTAL 9,318 12,760
Source: DNP, 1995b
3.2 COLOMBIA: A PLACE TO INVEST ?
As stated in the theoretical framework, investors will not only take into account
the characteristics of the projects. Other factors concerning the general environment are
crucial for the investment decision, particularly when the funds are to be tied for long
periods of time, and there is little or no marketability for the projects. Economic and
political stability, suitability of the legal framework and government's commitment among
others, shape the perception of the future outlook of the business environment, which
ultimately determines the attractiveness for private capital. These factors might be
weighted differently by each of the potential investors. For instance, foreigners might give
more importance to macroeconomic performance -- because of exchange rate risk -- than
local participants.
It is very difficult to provide a panorama that reflects the view of every investor, as
expectations and subjective factors play a role in the decision making process. For
example, after the Mexico's 1994 devaluation crisis, many investors removed their capital
from Latin America, because of worries about similar situations in other countries of the
region. In addition, an investor's decision of non participation may be a matter of
principle, like in the case of disagreement with the political system of a particular country.
This section presents the main features of the political, economic and legal
environment in Colombia, including the recent development of the local capital markets,
which are considered essential for a healthy future performance of privatization processes.
3.2.1 Economic and Political Stability
Colombia presents contrasts in its political, social and economic evolution. While
the stability of its democratic system has been considered an asset, Colombia shows a
great social instability as evidenced by the extensive guerrilla movements and drug traffic.
Violence has been the main output of this duality that has characterized the country's
recent history (Box 3.2).
Although the long-term effects are not clear, Colombia is currently facing a period
of unstable political situation: the elected president has been accused of receiving funding
from the drug lords for his presidential campaign. This situation has led to extensive
social debates and intensive investigations by the general attorney. This turmoil has been
accompanied by an escalation of the guerrilla action.
Economic performance has to be added to the picture. Colombia has a record of
sound macroeconomic management, including a conservative debt policy. Economic
growth, debt manageme.:t, inflation and credit ratings will be shortly presented below.
Colombia has been the only Latin American country to have positive growth every
year for the second half of the century; this comparison holds for the last 15 years. This
growth has been relatively stable without large increases, however, since 1980 the
compounded annual growth is 3.84%, one of the highest in the region. Even further, in
per capita terms the results have been good compared to some Latin American countries
(Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Economic Growth (1980-1994)
1980 = 1
GDP GDP per capita
1...... ARGENTINA
- --BRAZIL
1-2 CHILE
-COLOMBIA
1 i. ---i* MEXICO
0.8
80 82 84 88 88 90 92 94
Data source: Until 1990 - Wilkie, 1995. From 1991 - EIU, country reports 95-96
During the 1981-1983 world recession that lead the developing world to a debt
crisis, most of the countries defaulted their sovereign debt. During this difficult period,
Colombia was the only Latin American country that met all its debt payments, using its
foreign reserves and sometimes resolving its liquidity problem with new credits. It can be
said that the problem was of liquidity rather than insolvency, because of its ability to get
new loans. As of the end of 1994, Colombia's external debt was US$ 20 billion, from
which US$ 13.3 billion was public debt and US$ 6.7 private.
Inflation in Colombia has been high for a sustained period. Although the country
has not gone through any hyperinflation, since 1980 inflation has averaged 24.4% per
year. Because of sound fiscal policy, typical large fluctuations under high inflation periods
have not occurred. Even further, volatility has been the lowest in the region (Herz, 1996)
partly because of the periods of hyperinflation in some of the countries.
BOX 3.2: Clombia: Social and Political Legacy.
The Colombian political system has been dominated:: by two parties -- Liberal anc
Conservative:, almost sincethe indepefndence from Spain Overtime, differences betweev
the parties brought along violence. The most crude period, called "La Violencia" waI
between 1948 and 1958; during this years the estimated number of deaths exceeds
250,000. In 1953, the oly military regime of this century took the power in an attempt to
stop the ongo'ing ivil, war. In 1957, the traditional parties made an agreement called
"Frente Nacionat, which implied altemating the presidency and sharing cabinet and
congress positios for, 16 years -- fou presidetial periods. In 1974 president rotation
ceased, but te model of shared cabinet positions still remains. This situation is considered
the source of the feeling orexciusion felt by other iembers of society.
Guerrilla is ne of the most de-stailizin forces of the country. I has been active sinceyt most h
mid-60s, and is composed by seveal groups, ic the most i ant have been t
Movimenie 9 de AldLtM-l9, Fuerzas ArmlasRevo1ucionaral Colombia -FARC,
Ej6rcito Pboulai detbraci6n -EPL, Ej6rcitoý4' Liberaci6n Nacibnal -ELN, and the
Quintin Lam Of all ofthem, only the FARC and the ELN are still active, the other
groups were ::emobilized in the late-80's and early -90's, and accepted as part of the
democratic environment -- particularly the M-19 that became a political group. Efforts to
come: to an agreementwith the active groups continue on the part of the government.
Since the 1980s, the guerrilla has been involved i drug traffic, extortion and kidnapping.
Their focus on profit has somehow illegitimized the movement from an ideological
viewpoint.
Drug taffic. has caused great social unstability and has added complexity to Colombia's
international relations, particularly with the United States. Maybe the worst period in the
bilateral relations is currently, when there are some allegations about the financing of the
presidentialtdi mpaign by the drug lords of the Cali Cartel.
Violence brought by the drugs cartels has been intense, with several car-bombs,
kidnapping, extortion and assassinations.
The main credit rating firms have awarded Colombia a good grade. Colombia and
Chile are the only two Latin American countries that have credit ratings for their sovereign
debt.
Standard and Poors - S&P - assigns an A+ rating :z Lie country's local currency
denominated long term debt and a BBB- rating on foreign currency debt (see Annex 2 for
ratings). The higher rating for local currency reflect the country's ability to service this
debt given its powers of taxation and control over the domestic financial system. S&P
believes that the political difficulties should not affect the economic and financial
fundamentals. Although they recognize that the current situation, which has the country in
an 'internal state of commotion', can affect the financial markets in the short term, given
the weaker confidence in the markets and the consequent slowness in economic growth.
The stable outlook on local currency reflects the belief that fiscal and monetary policies
will result in steady growth, small fiscal imbalances and gradual disinflation. The outlook
on foreign debt reflects the belief that the same economic policies will strengthen the trend
in Colombia's balance of payments.
Credit ratings are not only an indicative of the country's economic situation. The
implication for infrastructure privatization programs, is that funding for projects will be
rated according to the country where they will be developed. Even further, the 'sovereign
ceiling' imposed by the host country, means that a particular project will never be rated
above the country's grade. Therefore, foreign financing can be relatively expensive. In
this sense, Colombia is in a good position.
3.2.2 Legal Framework for Private Participation
The overall reforms undertaken by the government were designed to incentivate
and allow the participation of the private sector in the provision of infrastructure and its
related services. The main objectives and changes for each sector were already presented,
and they demonstrate a drastic shift in the government's approach to the infrastructure
area.
In addition to the administrative reforms, one of the key changes was the
Contracting Statute' 2 passed in 1993. This statute updates and accommodates the
contracting rules between the government and the private sector. Two main features must
be highlighted from the Statute. The most important is that the private investor is
12 Law 80 of 1993.
guaranteed the restablishment of the "economic equilibrium", whenever the causes are not
imputable to the consortium. "Economic equilibrium" seems to mean profitability, and
therefore refers to not only direct costs but financial costs as well. This might be the
single most important contribution of the legal framework reform to attract private
investors. The second issue is the signaling of the government's long-term commitment to
this new trend.
3.2.3 Local Capital Markets Development
The aim of the reforms to the capital markets, that started since 1990, were to
change the existing characteristics of the capital markets: a weakly developed
securitization segment, and an inefficient banking system. Most of the debt of the privates
was through bank credits, as interests were tax deductible -- acting as a subsidy. Reforms
that supported this goal included privatization of nationalized banks; social security
reforms, with the creation of private pension funds; financial sector reforms to promote
competition and efficiency and the new role of the Central Bank as an agency relatively
independent from the executive branch.
The law 45 of 1990 -- called "Banking Law", was passed to update the financial
policies to facilitate the development of a more efficient and modern financial sector. By
regulating the information disclosure, the law would bring more transparency to the
system; and by introducing multibanking system, would increase the competition,
reducing the potential for market segmentation by allowing different kind of institutions to
perform the same activities (e.g. it allowed the banks to create parent stock brokers,
therefore part of the bank resources could be used in stock operations).
Laws 50 of 1990 created funds for an employee compulsory saving called
'cesantfas'. Before the law, the resources from the cesantfas were managed by the
employer. With the reform, the main financial institutions created a service to manage this
funds, enlarging the resources available in the capital markets. In a similar way, law 100
of 1993 modified the social security system, allowing the creation of private pension
funds. These pension funds will invest in the capital market. This system replaces the old
state owned pay-as-you-go one.
In addition, the government has shown interest in and commitment to the
development of a healthy capital market, through the creation of a public-private body
called "Misi6n para el Mercado de Capitales", with the following objectives'3:
1. To identify the most significant limitations, regulatory or of any kind, that make
difficult the development of the local capital markets.
2. To compare the regulation and development of Colombia's capital market,
with the most representative ones, and identify current trends.
3. To propose the strategy and regulation to increase the supply of public sectors
securities and the ones of the private sector when participates in the provision of
public goods (e.g. infrastructure).
4. To propose the strategy and regulation to develop financial instruments and
create portfolio valuation at market prices.
5. To examine the existing regulation, control and promotion of the capital
market, and to formulate recommendations.
6. To formulate recommendations regarding the organization and institutional
development of the capital markets.
However, in practice the results for strengthening the security segment have not
been particularly positive so far, as evidenced by the President of the Bogotai Stock
Market: "we have followed all recipes of the textbooks in order to increase the supply of
paperl4 here, without much success" (Carlos Caballero in Sedelnik, 1995). The picture is
more puzzling when considering that the Colombian tax regime provides great incentive
for equity investors, when compared to any other Latin-American country; the
13 From Decree 2352, October 20, 1994.
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government has undertaken the reforms that allows the creation of long term investors --
e.g., pension funds; and Colombia is one of the two Latin American countries with
investment grade rating. However, it seems that firms are reluctant to issue shares, as they
are afraid of the possibility of money made in illegal activities entering their business.
More specifically, in Colombia entrepreneurs are not willing to take the risk of receiving
money from the drug cartels. This at least is part of the explanation.
Finally, the Colombian agenda in the development of the internal capital market
takes into account the benefits and possibilities generated by infrastructure privatization
programs, as it can be seen in the following statement of one of the leaders of the process:
"Colombia is looking for the formula in order to take advantage of the development of
infrastructure so that it can be done parallel and simultaneously with the development of
the capital market" (in Sedelnik, 95). The idea behind this, is to develop the long-term
segment of the capital market by matching the supply of long-term securities -- issued by
the concessionaires, and their demand (by any investor, particularly the newly created
institutional ones).
3.3 THE ROADS
3.3.1 Colombian Highway Network
The historical development of the road network can be divided in three periods,
according to the rationale of expansion and to the administrative organization. The
evolution during this century shifted from intra-regional, through inter-regional, to
international emphasis.
The first period corresponds to the first half of the century when still the rivers, the
railways and old Spanish trails were the main modes of communication with the rest of the
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world. From the country's viewpoint, the connection of some of its regions with the rest
of the world was a key consideration, given the increasing importance of the coffee
exports. Therefore, because of the importa:.:e of other modes, road construction
developed with the purpose of joining some towns to their respective regional center.
This was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works, which was created in
1905. Difficult geographic conditions have always played a role on the communications
network development, as evidenced since the colonial period when Colombia had an
inward economic development (Halperin, 93).
The second period can be traced to the middle of the century, when the Currie
Mission' 5 found that the road network was not properly integrated, and that many regions
were isolated (DNP, 91). Therefore, this period was characterized by the emphasis on
constructing the linkages between the main regions of the country, through the connection
of the main cities. The role of the Central Government was emphasized, and by the end of
this period the government was responsible for 56% of the total network: all the primary
network, 55% of the secondary and 52% of the penetration roads (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Road Network
Road Classification Total Network 1Under National
Administration
('000 km) ('000 km)
National 6 6
Secondary 38 20
Penetration roads 58 30
Total 102 56
Source: DNP, 91
This high concentration of road administration had as a consequence a large
aulnuzation of the budget or scattered investment in several projects. This resulted in
inefficient execution of the works and high administrative cost for the Ministry (DNP, 91).
15 In 1949, Lauchlin Currie was head of the first World Bank study mission to any country (Currie,
81).
The political pressures and the burden on the budget to satisfy investments in so many
projects, delayed the maintenance works, leading to a high deterioration of the network
(Figure 3.2). The problem was exacerbated by the fact that delays increased the cost of
maintaining the National Network at desired levels to US$ 800 million, ten times more
than under periodic maintenance program (DNP, 95a).
Design specifications do not correspond to the country's present level of
development, as roads were designed for short-hauls and low traffic (DNP, 95). This has
become a major source of inefficiency for the operation of the road mode, particularly in
the presence of extensive mountainous conditions (Figure 3.2), where most of the
economic activity takes place. From the country's viewpoint this has become a major
constraint for development as the road mode has been dominant in the freight service, and
has tended to gain share oxertime (Figure 3.3).
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In addition, Colombia has low road density when compared to other countries of
similar development (Figure 3.4). This can be a consequence of the low level of
investment in the sector as a proportion of the GDP. The World Bank found that
countries with a lag in infrastructure development spend in roads between 2% and 3% of
the GDP, industrialized countries between 1.1% and 2. 1%, and Colombian investment has
been below 1.3% since 1970, with a decreasing tendency except for the years from 1992
(DNP, 95a).
Figure 3.4 Transport Infrastructure:
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Another significant problem of the network is related to the inability of the
government to enforce truck load limits, as overloading is a major cause of road
deterioration. Officials have recognized this as a major problem, and it seems that the
corruption generated by bribery and the lack of adequate equipment have been the main
obstacles to effectively enforce overloading.
The third period inherited the network described, and corresponds to the shift
given by the Barco (1986-1990) and Gaviria (1990-1994) administrations, where the
emphasis was made on the linkages of Colombia with the rest of the world. For this
purpose, a network called "Red Vial de la Apertura" was defined to be the only central
government's responsibility of the total network (Map 3.1). The new Constitution (1991)
facilitated this process as it mandated the decentralization of the government. The change
to internationalization emphasis can be evidenced as officials now refer to "main export
corridors", when they used to talk about roads "linking two main cities".
With the participation of the private sector in the construction and rehabilitation of
the road network, the government wanted to solve some of the main problems and update
the roads' condition.
3.3.2 The beginnings of the concession program
As exposed above, the government of Colombia made extensive reforms to the
legal and administrative environment to accommodate and attract new investors. Three
main laws were passed to set the general framework. The two first have already been
discussed and correspond to the law that created the Ministry of Transportation' 6 which,
through decentralizing roads, relieved the central government dispersion and allowed it to
concentrate in the strategic projects and the privatization program; and the Contracting
Statute, where the rules for the private sector participation in the public works were
updated to accommodate to the new needs.
16 Decree 2171 of 1992
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Map 3.1 Red Vial de la Apertura
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Finally, in 1993 the Congress passed the "Transport Law"", which created new
and altered old mechanisms for generating repayment flows for the concession projects,
such as toll securitization -- a long term financial instrument that allows the issue of
securities based on the tolls, and "valorizaci6n" -- a levy of a betterment project charge on
property that has been benefited from the construction of the road. In addition, the law
changed the land acquisition procedures, allowing the Ministry of Transportation to buy
land at market prices.
The government aims to involve the private sector in the construction,
rehabilitation, maintenance and operation of existing and new roads. This corresponds to
the Quadrant II in Miller's framework. How close to the vertical axis would depend in
this case on the level of detail of the designs, being closer when the definite designs are
included (Figure 3.5).
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For the period 1995-1998 the government plans to award 32 projects (Map 3.2),
consisting of 1.083 km of construction and 1.892 km of rehabilitation, requiring a total
17 Law 105 of 1993
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investment of US$ 2.3 billion, from which USS 2 billion are expected to come from the
private sector (Table 3.3). It is important to clarify that the label "construction" does not
always mean the construction of a new road, but the expansion of its current capacity,
typically from 1 lane to 2 lanes per direction.
Table 3.3 Road Program Cost and Scope
Type of Work Number of Length Cost
Projects (km) Total / Private Part.
(US$ million 1994)
Construction 17 1,083 671 / 671
Rehabilitation 15 1,892 1370 / 1675
Total 32 2.975 2.041 / 2.346
Source: DNP, 94b
According to a governmental official, visits were made to Mexico and Argentina in
order to understand each of the systems and to learn from their experience. He
acknowledged that the Colombian system has common features with both of them. The
idea of using concessions for existing roads from the Argentinean scheme and the use of a
trust to manage the funds from the Mexican system (see Boxes 3.3 and 3.4).
As of April 1995, 13 bidding processes were started, of which 10 have
already been awarded (Map 3.2 and Table 3.4). Of the 10 projects, 4 are classified as
construction and 6 as rehabilitation. The average cost of the projects of the whole
program is US$ 76 millions, presenting differences according to the type of work. For
instance, for construction the average is US$ 104 million, with a median of US$ 86
million; while for rehabilitation, the average and the median are US$ 44.7 million and US$
41 million respectively. For rehabilitation, all the projects that have already started are
below the median, while for construction ? out of the 4 are below.
Map 3.2 Road Privatization Program 1995-1998
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Table 3.4 Privatized Projects in Process as of April 1995.
Project Type of Number of Length Cost
Project Bidders (km) cUSs million 1994)
1. Buga - La Paila Constr. n.a. 58 59
2. BogotA - Villavicencio Constr. 2 55 230
3. Santa Marta - Paraguach6n Rehab. 1 250 35
4. Carreteras del Meta Rehab. 1 238 41
5. Bogotd - El Vino Rehab. 1 31 31
6. BogotAd- Guasca Rehab. 1 53 8
7. Barranquilla - La Cordialidad Rehab. 2 81 13
8. Bogotd - Facatativa Constr. n.a. 40 59
9. Desarrollo Norte de Bogotd Constr. 2 45 84
10. Cidnaga- Barranquilla Rehab. n.a. 60 27
Data source: DNP, 1995b
The government's policy for selecting the roads relied mainly on two criteria: a
road of the national highway network, coupled with a potential for profitability. As
income depends on traffic, the roads with heavier traffic were expected to be the first
awarded. Most of the time these roads should correspond to the closer segments of roads
communicating the main cities. The sample of 10 projects supports the previous point,
given that Bogotai, which is the capital and largest city, has 5 projects; and only 2 projects
are not close to the top four cities (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5 Concession Projects Location
City
Bogotai
Barranquilla
Cali
Santa Marta
Villavicencio
City Ranking18
Data source: Dane, 1991
18 The cities are ranked according to the 1990 projected population.
Number of
Projects
--- .L-I
According to officials interviewed, the government has considered the importance
of demonstration effect. For this it has made an effort of selecting projects with high
traffic, below US$ 100 millions and that run mainly through flat areas. Although this
criteria has been the case in most of the projects, there is an exception: the road Bogota-
Villavicencio, which not only is in mountainous terrain, but specially difficult ground
conditions are foreseen. In addition, the project is the second more costly of the whole
program: US$ 230 millions. In fact, officials recognize that this is the project with more
problems in the process. However, the government is committed to the success of the
program, and all the relevant entities are cooperating.
So far, it has been very difficult to attract foreign capital. Foreign resources are
present either as loans or through the participation of an international engineering firm, but
not as equity for investment purposes. One of the causes can be the poor promotion
efforts that government has undertaken, particularly at the international level. Although
this seems to be important, it is not clear the role played by other factors such as some of
the analyzed in the following section.
3.3.3 Risk And Other Main Issues
In order to analyze risk allocation and other major issues, 7 of 10 concession
contracts awarded as of April 1995 were studied' 9 (Map 3.2). To enrich the analysis
several parties involved in the program were informally interviewed. Interviewees
included governmental officials, a World Bank official, a lawyer that represents one
consortium, an investment banker, and some private participants representing the financial
side of the consortia. The missing group in this a!alysis corresponds to representativws of
the construction firms.
"9 The contracts correspond to the first 7 projects in Table 3.9.
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In the theoretical framework the importance of risk management and allocation
was stressed. For modeling purposes, three main issues were highlighted: investor's risk-
return trade-off, proper risk allocation, and interc., of government in reducing uncertainty.
Using the classification of country and project risk developed in the previous chapter, this
section studies the Colombian case through the review of these issues as treated in the
sample of contracts. In addition to risk considerations, other relevant points will be
discussed. While going through this section, it is interesting to notice that many of the
issues are the same that appeared in the Mexican and Argentinean cases (Boxes 3.3 and
3.4).
In order to deal with unexpected situations, the government established a
mechanism to be used whenever any compensation is required. In addition, it is important
to be aware of the awarding criteria, as it would help to better understand the relevance of
each of the issues, and to know over which parameters were the bidders competing.
Given the relevance of both issues, the "General Compensation System" and the awarding
criteria will be described first.
3.3.3 1 General Compensation System
According to the mandate of the Contracting Statute, the Ministry of
Transportation developed three ways for compensating the concessionaire in the event of
an economic disequilibrium -- i.e., variation of the internal rate of return. Extension of the
concession period, permission to increase tolls above the predetermined level, and direct
payments through the national budget are the three mechanisms included in the contracts,
and are expected to be used in this order of preference. However, all the mechanisms as
design,.cd have problems of liquidity. Liquidity of the guarantees is a key issue for
concessions, given that project finance will try to find the best available match between the
cash inflow and the debt payment schedule. Therefore, any change that alters the
cashflow profile will distort the consortium financial program. This is particularly acute in
the short run, when it could drive the consortium to a situation of liquidity crisis, reducing
the attractiveness and financiability of the project, as the debt issuers would be in a risky
position. Potential lenders may be reluctant to fund projects which are going over
difficulties if they consider that doing so would expose them further to risk (see Channel
Tunnel Case, Box 2.1).
Extending the concession period is the mechanism that has more intense impact in the
cashflow modification, as all the compensation will take place in the distant future.
Allowing to increase the tolls, is less drastic but it is as well a long term measure. Finally,
the use of resources from the national budget is the more liquid of all the cases, but still
will have a lag. It is uncertain how long this lag will be, particularly if the resources have
to follow all the established governmental procedures (e.g., be approved in the Congress).
The government could establish a fourth mechanism with the special characteristic of
being very liquid, in a way that corresponds to the private party needs. Such mechanism
could be a standby facility. The government could have a pre-approved credit, with for
example the World Bank, that would be used strictly for these cases, and otherwise would
not be disbursed. In this sense, concessionaires could have the resources without having
to redesign their financial program, and the government would be able to pay the
resources over a period of time (as opposed to the use of the third mechanism, the
national budget).
3.3.3.2 Awarding Criteria
Awarding criteria is key when analyzing privatization programs as it allows to
understand over what variables the concessionaires are competing. The information
presented is based on the case of the bidding process for the road Bogotai-Facatativi. This
road was awarded before April 1995, but it does not make part of the 7 contracts analyzed
in detail. However, to the best of my knowledge, the awarding formula remained
essentially the same for all the cases.
Seven criteria define the awarding formula: toll level - T, toll indexing - TI, level of
income guarantee - G, level of cost overruns borne by the concessionaire - CO,
construction - CL - and operation - OL - period length and additional works offered -
AW. The contract was to be awarded to the proposal with a lower score according to the
following formula:
Score = (T * TI) + (T * G) + (T * CO) + (T * CL) + (T * OL) + AW
Toll Level - T
In order to get a single number for this variable, the toll level proposed by the
concessionaire for each of the vehicle categories and toll booths is weighted. Rewriting
the awarding formula, the importance of this factor can be appreciated:
Score = T * (TI + G + CO + CL + OL) + AW
Toll Indexing - TI
This variable corresponds to the toll indexing formula that will be in place during
the life of the contract. For this specific case, the government gave two possibilities. The
first, to increase the toll whenever the Consumer's Price Index - CPI -, compounded from
the date of the previous toll increase, exceeds 10% or after a year of the previous increase
-- whatever comes first. The second, in a similar fashion but with 21% instead of 10%.
The scores awarded were 1.1 and 0.8 respectively.
Level of Income Guarantee - G
Traffic projections are given with the bidding documents, and the government
establishes a minimum traffic that it will guarantee. Based on this information, the
concessionaire proposes a value that corresponds to the percentage below which the
government would compensate the concessionaire. In other words, traffic levels between
the government's projections and the value proposed, the risk is borne by the
concessionaire. The government established that in no case the guarantee level could be
lower than 70%.
BOX 3A ROAD PRIVATIZATION IN ARGENTINA
Afte his -eletion in 1989, president Menem made public his structural economic reform progra
which included the reduction ofthe size of thegovernment, deregution of most sectors, and ope
borders to global competition. In an effort to foster confidence and reduce the possibility of financitig
public deficits by currency emissions, in 1991 the new peso was created and pegged to the dollar in atf*
exchange rate of 1 new peso per 1 dollar. :In addition, thegovernment was obliged to maintain in its
rsesrvesidollar for every new peso in circulation, and free change was allowed.
Privatization was part ofthe Reform Program, as an answer to the deficit exprienced by public
agencies, and to the lack of investment asources to keep •pacewith the requirements of the expected fast
economic growth. Highways, railways, waterways and ports were among the transport sector facilities
privatized.
The proceMs
Highways started early,-and in 1989 twelve 12-year concession bidding pr
first stage targeted the intercity highway systm , with deteriorated pivemen
km of roads with daily rffic of at least 2000 or 2,500 vehicles were
privatization. The ob tf the concessions was the maintenance, tehabilital
of the road - a major dilrence with the Mexican case, wiere new coi
target. The. concessions were awarded in t1990.
In 1992, t n-sot highway privatization started with a shiftin the
ss to the main metropolitan areas For the ca
Iconcessicnwere a ~ in 1994. Their objective was. to i.nc.aIse the
Western and Southei of the city. For oth Metropo eas (C
central government grned the provincial authorities to develop similar schetis
The Perfo .mance
• 
- pnvatizations a pear to be generaung many of the d
in i cyprices but not without problems and conplications.
For the intercity caseall twelve contracts were renegotiated in 1991. Two im
need of change. The firt one, regards the apparent inadequate governi
investment was required some years after awarding the contract, once the
built some capital from toll collection. However, users - that were not previ
- found unacceptable being tolled before major improvements took place. TI
a measure tofight inflation tbat rendered price indising illegal, which was th
The r sultowertolls and reduced scope in the expansion. Although it can
are solved since 199 fw complaints have taken place Road conditions
road although there is no evidence that the maintenance costs an
administration. Finally, by 1995, some concessionaires have started arq
economic p the initial capacity expansion is required and should be inc
For the Metropolitan access case few issues have emwged, partly becau
experiences wore phe- no tolls were charged before road improvemei
are recentcontractO
to de e  some badly needed increases in urtl
Sthatmight not have built otherwise." (G6mez-
Cost Overruns - CO
The government recognizes the following cost overruns, as long as they are not
imputable to the concessionaire: 100%, if the o,.,-,run is below 30% of the proposed cost -
- indexed by inflation; 75%, if the overrun is between 30% and 50%; and nothing when
the overruns exceeds 50%. Nevertheless, the concessionaire is free to propose any value
X -- lower than 50%, from which it assumes full responsibility for the cost overruns. The
score was calculated as follows:
CO = 1.0 -(50% -X%)
Construction Period Length - CL
The score for the construction period is calculated as follows:
CL = 0.5 * (Y / 24),
where Y is the number of months proposed by the concessionaire to undertake the
construction. It is reasonable to assume the government's estimates for this activity is 24
months.
Operation Period Length - OL
In a similar fashion to the construction case, the score for the operation is
calculated as follows:
CL = 0.5 * (Z / 168),
where Z is the number of months proposed by the concessionaire for the operation of the
road. It is reasonable to assume the government estimates that with 168 months the
concessionaire could get an acceptable return.
Additional Work - AW
The principle for this case is that the government lists one or more potential works,
which is not the most important but that could be of use, and the concessionaire gets
additional reduction in the score for it -- remember that the minimum score is the one that
gets the contract. From the information available, the scoring mechanism for this variable
is not very clear. However, given that they are not part of the main object of the contract,
their relative weight in the awarding process should be low.
In sum, of the seven criteria, the dominant one seems to be the toll level - TO - as
it affects five variables. Additional Work - AW, which is not multiplied by the toll level
should, in principle, not be a decisive variable as it does not reflect the core of the project.
In order to provide an idea of the relative importance of each of the variables, Table 3.6
summarizes the range of the values for the five cases that are affected by the toll level.
Table 3.6 Value Range of the Awarding Criteria
Criteria Value Range
Toll Indexing - TI Either 0.8 or 1.1
Level of Income Guarantee - G Higher than 0.7
Cost Overruns - CO Between 0.5 and 1.0
Construction Period Length - CL Around 0.5
Operation Period Length - OL Around 0.5
The government has considered that an
may be unnecessarily complicated, and therefore
variables.
awarding formula with so many criteria
they are working to reduce the number of
3.3.3.3 Country Risk
Country risk takes into consideration variables that affect the project but that do
not depend at all on the concessionaire's performance, and that normally can be influenced
by governmental policies. These risks are usually of an economic, political and/or
regulatory character, and therefore are not related to the performance of the consortium.
Ho'wever, they have significant impact on the investors' perception of risk, which
determines the level of return demanded, and limits the number of potential participants.
The most important sources of risk for the Colombian case will be discussed.
Inflation
Colombia has had relatively high inflation for a long period of time. Since 1980,
inflation has been fluctuating between 20% and 35%. Indexing for inflation is not
uncommon in almost every sector of the economy. Few, but significant examples are:
salaries which are usually indexed in a yearly basis, savings corporations that provide both
indexed saving accounts and indexed housing loans, and indexation of the key public
services. Even further, public works have been traditionally indexed. This was
particularly important when the execution of a contract could last over 5 years. Under
these circumstances prices could be more than twice the originals at the end of the period -
- maintaining the real value constant. In concessions, as contracts are long-termed, the
uncertainty rises and therefore inflation provisions are obvious for an environment that is
familiar with its use.
Contracts have provisions for inflation risk, in such a way that the private sector
would not bear it. Tolls will maintain the real value through time, unless the government
considers that there are enough reasons to change the rule, in which case the
concessionaire would be compensated using the "General Compensation System". The
contracts allow for an updating of tariffs either every year, or when the accumulated
inflation since the previous update exceeds a certain value. This value is one of the
bidding selection criteria, therefore is determined by the concessionaire in its proposal. Of
the seven contracts of the sample, four have a value of 20%, two of 10%, and one, the
Barranquilla-Cordialidad project, 21%.
The government however, has power to change the toll indexing rule and this,
from the private sector viewpoint, is an important source of uncertainty particularly
because it changes the profile of the future cashflow, while the debt payment schedule
remains the same.
Currency Devaluation
The issue of devaluation is not mentioned in the contracts -- neither in the
Mexican nor in the Argentinean case. The government considers that this risk should be
borne by the private sector (DNP, 95b), which coincides with the principles developed in
the theoretical framework, particularly in relation to its commercial nature. However,
given the long-term character of the contract and the uncertainty about Colombia's future
performance might be too high a risk to be borne by the private parties. In an extreme and
hypothetical case of full foreign financing, it is very unlikely that someone would like to be
exposed to a risk that implies having the assets (expected toll level) and the liabilities in
different currencies, a very volatile market, for a long period of time. Under these
circumstances, and in an effort to reduce uncertainty, it may be in the best interest of the
country to provide mechanisms that reduce this risk. The government could for example,
study the possibility of setting some guarantee that is effective when a certain difference
between the devaluation and inflation rates occurs, as exposed in chapter two.
Foreign Currency Availability and Convertibility
There is no consideration of these issues in the contracts. Two main reasons may
account for this: first, the concessionaires are mainly composed by local firms and second,
the economic and political stability of the country -- despite current turmoil.
Political and Regulatory
With the law 80 of 1993, the Contracting Statute, legal and regulatory risk has
been greatly reduced. This Bill establishes that any circumstance not imputable to the
private party, the "economic equilibrium" would be reestablished by the government. For
instance, tax reforms, changes in the rules of toll indexation or any regulatory change
would be covered by the law 80, and therefore should not restrain the private sector to
participate in the privatization process. However, it is important to notice that although
profitability should not be affected, liquidity may become a problem for the
concessionaire, as discussed above. It is also noteworthy that the Contracting Statute
does not allow for automatic adjustment, but gives the right to ask for the required
adjustment. the concessionaire
Although expropriation can be a risk feared by foreign investors, the democratic
tradition and political stability of the country may be the best guarantee.
Dispute Resolution
According to the contracts, for the road privatization program the dispute
resolution mechanism is rather straightforward: the Ministry of Transportation decides.
At first glance this may be perceived as a great risk for the private party, however
previous experience may mitigate the effect. As the concessionaires have had previous
business relations with the Ministry, they may know how to deal with the issue, either
because the Ministry has a reputation of fairness and has not used such power, or because
of the widespread belief that in Colombia a lawsuit filled against the Ministry is a lawsuit
won.
Although there is no evidence, the dispute resolution scheme built in the contracts
may have stopped foreign participants.
Demand - Minimum Traffic Guarantees and Maximum Traffic Conditions
Demand is a core issue in the contracts. Given the long term nature of the deals,
there is great uncertainty about levels of traffic. Although future is always uncertain, the
reforms undertaken by the government in recent years have driven the country to a
position of difficult predictability. It is not clear yet in which markets the country will
develop a comparative advantage, and how will this affect the demand for road
transportation services. In order to reduce uncertainty, and create a market for the
projects, the government awards a Minimum Traffic Guarantee. In addition, to participate
of potential situations of unexpected high demand, the contracts includes allocation
decision rules.
Minimum and maximum traffic and toll levels, by vehicle category, are included in
the contract. The contract defines a certain value below which the private party will be
compensated, and another value above which a defined allocation rule applies. The first of
the two values, which represent the minimum income, is part of the criteria for the bid
selection.
The most important is the Minimum Traffic Guarantee, as it creates a market for
the projects by reducing uncertainty. In this way, the risk for the capital suppliers is
greatly reduced. As stated in the theoretical framework, for this kind of projects capital
suppliers, such as lenders, base their participation on the potential cashflow generated and
not on the equity of the consortium. The pool of potential participants as capital suppliers
is enlarged with this kind of provisions. Even further, without such arrangements it might
be impossible to attract any lender.
The mechanism established in the contract to define the level of compensation is by
comparing the actual income and the forecasted minimum income. The values are
calculated simply by multiplying the toll by the traffic for each vehicle category and adding
them up, making the required inflation corrections for comparability. Substantial
differences between the first contract, Buga - La Paila, and the rest of the sample exist.
For the former, the compensation to be paid each year is calculated based on the values of
the same year, irrespective of the results of previous years. In contrast, the second group
of contracts compare the values of all previous years -including previous compensations,
and pays only when such value is lower that the similar projected value. From the
investor's viewpoint, this might be less attractive, but in a way it is insuring a certain
profitability level. From the government's perspective, this change brings at least two
advantages: risk and administrative cost reductions. The former is rather straightforward,
as it may exist cases "of a bad year" where normally the government would have to
compensate, but if the profits made during previous years compensate the loss, then the
government is relief from the obligation of compensation. For the latter, the savings
I I
comes from the administrative effort that the Ministry has to make to include the resources
into the national budgct, and complying with all the required paperwork.
However, the important question to ask is How important is this change from a
risk reduction perspective?
The Maximum Traffic conditions present two different cases. For the first contract
-- Buga - La Paila -- the concessionaire would keep the resources up to an income of
125% of the projected. For the other six cases, above a certain maximum traffic level, the
resources would be shared 50-50. The 50% of the government have to go to a trust, and
can only be used for works in the road. The rationale for the 50% of the concessionaire is
for compensation for the increase in maintenance cost due to increased traffic. In all the
six cases, the ratio between Maximum and Minimum Traffic is 1.2. From the information
available, it is not clear whether this ratio was prefixed, or whether all concessionaires
offered similar levels of Minimum Traffic -- which was the awarding criteria. What is
clear is that with this ratio, no proposal could offer a Minimum Income Guarantee below
0.83% -- the minimum established for the Bogotai-Facatativd road was 70%, otherwise the
Maximum traffic would be below the projected one. To get a proper understanding, it
would be interesting to have further research on this issue.
Financing
The financing risk, particularly in the refinancing phase is borne by the consortium.
Refinancing is necessary for projects that raise the funds in markets where long-term
financing does not exist. Conscious of the benefits of reducing this risk, the government is
studying the possibility of setting up a facility, with the participation of the World Bank,
that could guarantee the refinancing conditions. In addition, it is expected to offer
financial instruments with longer maturities.
3.3.3.4 Project Risk
Project risks considers issues that are affect each specific project. Given that the
uncertainty associated with each of the phases of the project is substantially different, each
of the stages will be separately considered.
Planning And Preparation
This is the most risky part of the venture, because the bidders do not have the
certainty of winning the bid. Whereas the level of investment for this phase is low when
compared to the construction period, the financial demands of competition can be high.
Traffic Projections
It is important to realize that under changing conditions in the economy (see
Argentina case), in the production settlement patterns, in the trucking technology, and
inexperience with elasticities related to tolls (see Mexico case) it is very likely that
forecasts will prove inaccurate. Nonetheless, traffic and toll levels are the most important
issues with respect to income in the concession program. Expected profitability is then
based on the traffic level forecast, which in combination with the overall risk perception,
has substantial influence over bidders' final proposal. The Ministry of Transportation has
been responsible of providing the projections along with the bidding documents.
Projections were contracted out by the Ministry to local consultants, who used
simple regression methods, resulting in unreliable estimations -- in some cases the same
traffic growth rate was applied to every year from 1993 to 2013 and for all the toll booths
and for every vehicle category. Although participants in the process might go over the
projections, it is time consuming (particularly with the short time frame of two months
allowed for bid preparation), and costly to undertake such exercise. Therefore it is in the
best interest of the government to provide make an extra effort to produce as credible
projections as possible. There has been a shift in the government's strategy, and they are
recognizing the importance of providing good quality projections. This is evidenced in a
project that is currently under preparation. whec well known international consultants in
the field were hired to undertake this task.
For policy makers this issue is difficult to handle, as the projections are very likely
to be wrong. The question is then, how different would the deviation be from the actual
traffic of simple or sophisticated projections? Would the use of the sophisticated ones
ensure better results? Everyone hopes that this is the case. However, besides the accuracy
of any kind of projections, the issue is that the government must provide forecasts at least
:s good as the ones the private party would have undertaken. Of course, this policy is
rather loose, but at least it provides a guideline for action.
Design and Previous Knowledge of the Project
In a rush to start the execution of the privatization program, the Ministry started
processes with poor quality designs (see Mexico case). In some cases, Phase 120 and/or
old and outdated designs were used21. The risk of funding mismatch is likely to be high
given that the consortium is expected to find the financing for the project, major changes
in the total cost may arise, and delays may happen. Depending on the risk level, liquidity
may be compromised. The devastating consequences of a liquidity crisis have been treated
with more detail in the discussion over the "General Compensation System".
In principle, the return is not greatly affected as the government recognizes a
substantial portion of the costs, as explained later in the cost overruns section. In practice,
the consortium is asked to bear part of the risk of the mispreparation of the project. This
is particularly important because the government is asking the private sector to assume a
20 Phase I corresponds to a preliminary study that uses aerial photography with scale between
1:25.000 and 1:10.000, and uses existing maps to determine all technical features (geotechnical,
geological, hydraulic and hydrologic). The geometric design consists of determining the feasible lines and
deduce the approximate alignment.
21 Information provided by ofticials interviewed.
risk, that although normally considered to be best handled by the concessionaires, it is
exogenous to them.
Even further, I consider that the government may be exposing itself and the
concessionaire to unnecessary risks as a result of a weaknesses in the project preparation
process. Assuming that the final cost of the project is not related with the preparation
effort, but that the difference between the final and the forecasted cost is much greater in
the case of poor preparation, the government is not in a good position to predict an
appropriate level of risk provisions.
The government has been considering different options, and among them the
possibility of contracting out the final designs, and include them as an input to the request
for proposals, liberating the concessionaire of this task22. Currently, the concessionaire
has a period that oscillates between 3 and 6 months after the signature of the contracts to
complete the final designs.
To what extent should the designs be completed? How much discretion to the
private party should be allowed, as to gain from their experience? How much should the
uncertainty be reduced by providing final designs? Which are the risks associated with
providing final designs? These decisions are part of fundamental trade-offs that policy
makers have to face.
Technology
The technology issue seems to be in accordance with the theoretical framework.
Road construction techniques, similar to the traditionally used in Colombia are expected to
be used in the program. Although there is no reference to the issue in the contracts,
concessionaires might want to use some different technologies to cut their costs.
Particularly, innovation may come from the technology transfer that can take place
between local and foreign engineering firms that participate in many of the consortia.
22 This corresponds to a shift to the left in Miller's Analysis Framework (Figure 2.1).
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However, one of the financing parts interviewed said that they are looking for foreign
engineering firms to be, part of the consortium. because of the weak financial capacity of
the local firms relative to the size of the projects. but not because of technical weaknesses.
If the government decides to include the final designs, this may be interpreted as a
government's commitment with reducing uncertainty rather than with promoting
technological innovations.
Environmental License Procurement and Mitigation Plan
Environmental license procurement is one of the issues that has brought more
discussion in the road privatization program. There has been some evolution in the
contracts: while in the first concession awarded, six months before the others, the
environmental license was not mentioned, in the second contract the responsibility of
procurement was on the Ministry of Transportation, and for the following contracts the
responsibility was shared. From a reading of the contracts it is not clear which is the
difference between the full and shared responsibility. In both cases, the government would
recognize all the costs that are a consequence of delays in the license procurement, and the
extra cost resulting from the need of additional work required for the Environmental
Mitigation Plan. The government recognizes these extra cost through the "General
Compensation System". As discussed before, one of the main problems of this system is
its unsuitability to properly meet the concessionaire's needs, particularly the debt payment
schedule. In principle, getting the license should not be particularly difficult given that
most of the works are where existing projects are, even if in some cases are require
expansion of the capacity. However, it would be important to study the typical delays and
reasons caused by environmental procedures in Colombia.
The governmental agency in charge of issuing the environmental license and
approving the mitigation or management plan is the recently created Ministry of the
Environment. With a stronger autonomy exercised by local mayors, issuing has become a
difficult task of coordination, particularly when national interests differ from local ones.
The delays caused by the time required to have approved the license might be against the
privatization program, and the government should take some action on this. One of the
possibilities available is that before the opening of the bidding process, there is an
agreement in principle with the authorities implied.
Land Availability and Acquisition
The contract has defined a rather difficult mechanism for land acquisition. The
main limitations arise from the precarious level of detail in the designs and the financial
constraints. The contracts state that the concessionaire is responsible for providing the
resources for acquiring the land plots. The resources must be deposited in a fiduciary
created under the contract's framework for the construction and operation of the road.
The Ministry is responsible for the negotiation and acquisition of the land, according to the
working plan, liable for the adequate provision of the land, in such a way that no delay
should occur. The working plan is not necessarily the original one as it might have some
modifications resulting from the final designs.
Two problems can arise from this procedure: time delays and land cost above
target. For the former, the contract stipulates that the delays will not be considered to be
the concessionaire's fault, and that any resulting economic imbalance would be paid
through the "General Compensation System". For the latter, the concessionaire is
responsible for providing the total amount of the resources, and the difference will be paid
back by the government using the "General Compensation System" as well.
From the interviews of both private sector and government, it can be said that the
land acquisition and availability process has been one of the major problems in the
Colombian toll road privatization program. Although they arise during the construction
process, the difficulty is of planning nature. However, because the acquisition is during
the construction period, the problem arises in that phase. It is worth mentioning that the
critic is not to the practice of buying the land close to the time when it is required, as this
might be better from a use of resources viewpoint, but to the uncertainty that is created
about its availability on time.
Contract Negotiation
The main issue in the negotiation of the contract is the level of competitiveness in
the bidding process. Of all sectors in the Colombian infrastructure privatization process,
the road sector is the one that presents the lowest average bidders per project (Table 3.7).
More than half the cases studied had only I bidder. In those, the procedure allowed the
direct negotiation with the only bidder instead of starting a new bidding process. Under
these circumstances it is very likely that pressures felt by Ministry to snow results, gave
the consortium a powerful position during the final negotiations. This is by no means an
assessment of the issue as the bidding documents were not reviewed.
Table 3.7 Average Bidders per Sector
Sector Average Number of
Bidders Projects
Airports 6 1
Electric 3.5 6
Gas Transport 2 4
Water 2
Roads 1.4 7
Data source: DNP, 95b
The speed of the process could have stopped the participation of many consortia.
However, according to one of the officials interviewed, most of the consortia were formed
by many of the largest local construction firms joining together. Therefore, each of them
was participating in several projects. This may be the main cause for having only one
proposal per project. Even further, if this is so. even before awarding the project the
bidder knew that the possibility of competing bidders was extremely low, and under these
circumstances it is very possible that the efficiency gains from competition were lost -- one
of the main goals of privatization programs.
Whatever the reason for this problem, what is really interesting is the warning
signal sent to the government. For the future agenda, something has to be improved to
make sure that the country would benefit from the efficiency gains of the private sector,
only realizable in a competitive environment. One of the reasons could be the sector's
lack of attractiveness, real or perceived, particularly as an aftermath of the Mexico toll
road experience (See Mexico case), as has been stated by all the interviewees.
Quality of the Bidding Documents
There is a concern regarding the quality of the bidding documents. This has been
stated by all the parties involved, when asked about the issue. Although most of the
problems concerning the quality have already been discussed, it is useful to focus on the
role of the bidding documents. As exposed in the theoretical framework, these documents
determine the basis on which the different participants will make their proposals,
according to their assessment of the business opportunity.
If this is modeled through the risk-return trade-off, the government has an
incentive to reduce the sources of uncertainty that may arise from this key document. This
has been acknowledged by the government in a document about private participation in
the infrastructure sector of April 1995 (DNP, 1995b). For the road program, the
government has decided to make of the Tobia Grande-Puerto Salgar project an example
because of its preparation and promotion. From the preparation point of view, leading
international investment banks and consultants were hired, for the bidding document
production and the main technical studies that support it.
A better and clearer knowledge of the project by all the participants allows a better
allocation of risks. Under these circumstances of reduced uncertainty, parties should be
more willing to accept the risks as better assessment becomes easier.
~II
Construction
When the contract is awarded uncertainty is greatly reduced. However, a
relatively short period (when compared to total length of the contract) of high resource
requirements and high risk starts. The main issues during the construction phase are
related to costs increases that may lead to liquidity difficulties. Many of the problems that
arise during this period have their origin in the previous phase. The main issues are
discussed below.
Time Delays
Each party should be responsible for the delays that it has caused. In the contracts,
delays are penalized according to the phases of design and construction, and the penalties
are stated as daily amounts (percentages of the estimated cost of the phase, 0.1% for
design and 0.01% for construction). This kind of structure is common in the contracts
irrespective of the kind of arrangement.
Delays caused by land acquisition problems tend to be the most common type of
delays not imputable to the concessionaire. The main issues around land acquisition have
already been analyzed. The private party should be compensated through the "General
Compensation System".
Another source of delays are due to Force Majeure events, in which case the
concessionaire will not be penalized, but will not be compensated either.
Cost Overruns
Cost overruns is an interesting issue to analyze in the Colombian case. There are
four different ways of having cost overruns. The first is related to unpredictable additional
amount of work derived from the preliminary nature of original designs. The amount in
which this additional work varies, normally depends on the quantity and quality of the
information gathered during the preparation of the bidding documents. The second is
related to the management of the project itself, and it is not worth further discussion, as its
consequences clearly must be responsibility of the concessionaire. The third type
corresponds to a paragraph -- that not always exists -- in contract scope clause called
"optional works", which defines additional works that may be undertaken. The last one
corresponds to additional work not considered in the original project, but that the
government deems worth undertaking. In principle the first two cases should be borne by
the private party. The last one, as it was not part of the original contract must be paid by
the host government.
For the first case, unexpected additional work within the scope of the contract, risk
was allocated differently across the sample contracts analyzed. In one case, Buga-Tulua,
this issue is not mentioned, therefore it can be said that the risk is totally assumed by the
private sector. For the contracts signed in August 1994 this issue was included, however
there are differences. In four out of the six contracts, the government assumes full risk
when the final cost does not exceed 130% of the estimated cost. Over this value the risk
is totally transferred to the consortium. In one of the cases, the threshold is 110% instead
of 130%. For the remaining contract in the sample, the formula is more complicated, as
the government assumes full risk up to 130% of the cost, 75% of the risk between 130%
and 150%, and above 150% the private sector assumes full responsibility (Table 3.8). A
condition for the government to assume the risk is that the additional work cannot be
caused by reason imputable to the consortium.
Table 3.8 Risk Allocation for Cost Overruns
Project Type of Cost Overrun Risk allocation
Project Gov/Consortium
Buga - La Paila C 0 / 100
Bogoti - Villavicencio C < 30% 100 / 0
Sta Marta - Paraguach6n R < 30% 100 / 0
Carreteras Meta R < 30% 100 / 0
Bogoti - El Vino R < 30% 100 / 0
30%< x <50% 75 /25
Bogotai - Guasca R < 30% 100 / 0
Barranquilla - La Cordialidad R < 10% 100 / 0
__
The level of cost overruns assumed by the concessionaire was one of the seven
awarding criteria for the Bogotai - Facatativai project, therefore it is likely that it was so for
the other contracts as well. It is clear that the formula varies, therefore as there was no
information available for all the contracts it is difficult to provide concluding remarks. It
would be interesting to analyze all cases, and compare the conditions offered by the
government in the biding documents with the ones in the proposals, to see if always
correspond to cases were the concessionaire bears the lowest possible risk.
Some Colombian officials consider that the government is more exposed to risk
than it should be as a consequence of these agreements. On the other hand. one of the
financing participants in one of the consortia mentioned that the engineering firms were
not willing to assume cost overrun risk with the existing level of detail in designs. Once
again the focus should be in the quality of the requests for proposals. The case just
exposed shows a clear trade-off between the bidding documents preparation and the
ability to allocate the risks in a more efficient way.
The third type, "optional works", the treatment is the same than for unexpected
additional work within the scope of the project (Table 3.8).
For the last case, additional work outside the scope of the contract, the important
issue is the determination of the cost of the new work. For the Colombian case, the
contracts of the sample stipulate that the cost of the new work will be calculated based on
the unit costs presented in the proposal, indexed by inflation. In the event were there are
unitary costs that were not defined before, a negotiation should take place.
It is important to notice that there are no single formulas, but rather there is a
dynamic process. For instance, In Mexico the concessionaire was fully responsible for the
first 15% of cost overruns.
Force Majeure
As expected, the government recognizes all the amounts required to reconstruct
any damaged part caused by an event of force majeure. The concessionaire will be
exempted of all its responsibilities and delays caused by such events, but it will not be
compensated for that. However, in the six contracts of the sample signed in 1994, the
government will still maintain the minimum level of traffic guarantee. This is motivated by
the fact that concessionaires have predetermined financial obligations.
Subcontracting
According to the contracts, the concessionaires are free to subcontract any of the
works required, but they remain fully responsible for the works, both in standards and
schedule.
Operation
Operation is the longest phase of the contract, 14.3 years on average for the
Colombian case (Table 3.9). The issues discussed are related to the uncertainty about the
future and the way they are managed. As experienced has shown that forecasts are very
likely to be wrong, future demand based on projections may be the most important
consideration during operation. However, with time risk reduces as a general pattern of
demand is developed, and realizable income is more predictable. The parties can assess
better the situation even if it turned out to be a better than or worse than expected
situation.
Table 3.9 Contract Duration
Project Type of Contract Operation
Project Duration Duration
(Years) (Years)
Buga - La Paila C 15.0 13.8
Bogoti - Villavicencio C 16.0 14.8
Sta Marta - Paraguach6n R 16.3 15.5
Desarrollo Llanos R 19.3 18.0
Bogoti - La Vega R 15.8 14.5
Patios - Guasca R 13.4 12.0
Barranquilla - La Cordialidad R 12.3 11.6
Average 15.4 14.3
Weighing Stations
An important issue of the concession system is the benefit brought by shifting away
the responsibility and incentive of controlling the weight of the freight vehicles from the
governmental agencies to the private party, who is expected to be significantly more
efficient. The main incentive the concessionaire has for performing an adequate control
are the potential savings in maintenance costs, and their positive effect on profitability.
This part of the contract does not pretend to replace the "Policifa Vial" with the
concessionaire or to put police functions in the private sector, but rather to create a
coordination between both of them for this task, and presumably as a way to fight bribery
-- as exposed in chapter 2. The Police remains the only body authorized to issues
overloading tickets.
Operation Agreements are part of the contracts. Weighing is among the activities
regulated, and it is expected of the concessionaire to weigh half of the freight vehicles that
use the road. Weighting has always been a major problem for the maintenance of the road
network. Colombian authorities have been unable to control overloaded freight vehicles.
This practice deteriorates the road conditions, increasing the maintenance cost and
reducing the expected life of the road.
Road performance - competing road
As opposed to the Mexico case, in Colombia there is not always a free road as an
alternative to a toll road. Even further, the roads that are being released to concession are
the current most busy ones in the country. The contract does not define any situation
about the construction of a competing road, particularly the possibility of a road built by a
local or regional authority. However, the concessionaire is not exposed to the downside
risk, as the contract includes the Minimum Traffic Guarantees.
Exit Option
The contract is not clear about an early termination of the agreement. This
uncertainty is more relevant when project financing is practiced, as the guarantee of the
lenders is off-balance sheet (i.e., mainly the cashflow generated by the project as opposed
to the equity of the consortium). What the contract provides is the certainty that the
investment already made will be paid to the consortium, under any circumstance.
Mechanisms for allowing the current owner of the project to sell it are not defined either.
Maintenance Standards
An operational agreement makes part of the concession contract, where the
standards for the operation phase are defined. It is responsibility of the concessionaire to
maintain them, and failing to do so results in penalties.
IV. FINAL REFLECTIONS
This chapter will be more focused on presenting reflections over the main issues
discussed before, rather than presenting straightforward conclusions. The exercise carried
throughout this thesis was to understand how applicable the theoretical principles of
privatization infrastructure are, and to go over the main points that explain why
privatization poses new and major challenges to policy makers.
The Colombian case presents an attempt to include the participation of the private
sector in the provision of roads, just as the Mexican or Argentine ones. There are
differences and similarities among all of these cases, as an evidence of the inexistance of a
single formula for privatizing infrastructure. The basic principles that guide the issue offer
a wide variety of possibilities, and therefore policy makers around the world have the task
of finding options that are suitable for their environment and acceptable for foreign
participants.
Three different levels can be taken into account. First, the general economic and
investment environment of the country, which is outside the road program, but that is
considered to influence greatly its development. Second, the strategy pursued by the
government for infrastructure procurement, and finally, at a micro level, the issues that
arise from the projects or contracts. For the purposes of this thesis, the country level is
exogenous. Therefore, in this section instead the information will be presented without
further reflection about the fundamentals of privatization.
Country Level
The main issues discussed at the country level were the general social, political and
economic environment, the legal framework and the development of the local capital
markets. Although all of them are outside the field of infrastructure provision, they all
play a role for the implementation, development and performance of the privatization
schemes.
The most complex picture is presented at the social and political aspects.
However, despite these issues, the economic and investment environment seems to be
adequate, and Colombia's recent economic performance has started to gain international
recognition. Particularly thanks to its sound macroeconomics management and its
sustained stable growth.
The legal framework has recently experienced major changes. The most important
piece of legislation is the law 80 of 1993 --Contracting Statue. which creates a suitable
environment for private sector participation. Its main contribution can be divided in two:
signaling to the private sector of the long-term commitment with the process, and most
important, the guarantee of a fair return.
For the capital market development, the government has been working trying to
create the conditions for a more efficient banking system and the strengthening of the
securities market. The development of the market for securities, both in volume and in
variety of maturities -- particularly long-termed, would be of great importance for the
future evolution of the infrastructure provision strategy. Currently the government is
working in parallel, as it has stated that the current infrastructure privatization is a suitable
vehicle for the development of long-term securities.
In general, it can be said that at the country level, Colombia has been implementing
the policies that support a healthy infrastructure privatization program. In the aspects
were further development is required, like the capital markets, the government is
supporting the change in the right direction.
Program Level
The strategy foilowed by the government during the time comprising the contracts
analyzed can be characterized by relatively short periods of preparation and potentially
large requirements for the "maintenance of the contract". By "maintenance of the
contract" I mean the time and effort that will be required for the contract's administration.
That is resolving all the emerging conflicts, particularly regarding compensation. Figure
4.1 and 4.2 show graphically the effort required for each of the three activities. The
former represents the potential current situation, which may have been created by an urge
to produce results. The latter presents a strategy which has as one of the main objectives
to reduce future conflict, allowing for a more efficient use of the resources and for better
preparation of the projects.
Figure 4.1 Potential Activity Effort
P•P Io II Gbntracti
Figure 4.2 Proposed Activity Effort
There has already been a change in the preparation of the projects, but the results
are to be judged in the future. It would be interesting to follow up the process and
compare with the current situation. This thesis may be the basis for comparison for future
work. Of course, the government's strategy is not set in terms of effort for each of the
activities. Therefore, this analysis is more directed to the output and the way the
resources are used.
It is noteworthy that none of the parties' business is going to court. However if
they have to for the survival of their firm, they will do so. This may be particularly true in
the case of Colombia, where there is the widespread belief that a lawsuit against the state
is a won lawsuit. Nevertheless, in normal circumstances, if firms have other attractive
investment options, they would search for alternatives where most of the time could be
spent in their core competence.
It is noteworthy that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the
program, partly because there are not many projects in full operation. However, there is
room to highlight some critical aspects in the development of the road privatization
program.
Project Level
Project or contract level refers to the issues that are still very general, but that do
not make part of the global strategy. Four main issues should be highlighted: awarding
criteria, competition in the process, risk and future conflict.
Colombian policy makers have considered that there are too many awarding
criteria, and that they do not necessarily lead to the improvement of the bids. Therefore,
they are currently working on a simpler formula. From the interviews, it was evident that
the participants consider that the process has been transparent -- maybe because there was
only one bidder in many cases. However, policy makers may not decide to go to the
extreme of using a single criterion like in Mexico. A careful selection must be done, to
avoid undesirable outputs like the Mexican shortest concession period criterion.
Competition in the bidding process is a goal to be sought, otherwise the country
will not be able to take advantage of its benefits. The government has already taken steps
towards a better promotion of the projects.
A large part of this work is dedicated to the analysis of risk, its sources and the
way it should be managed. The search of potential sources of risk and its proper
allocation is essential for the success of privatization programs. Adequate risk allocation
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leads to the reduction of the project's overall risk, as the parties involved have a clear
idea of their responsibilities and their rights. A big effort should be applied to the task of
allocating risk to the party that can best handle it, as it is the basis for the construction of a
fair deal. A detailed and careful risk analysis is necessary to avoid conflict throughout the
life of the contract.
Infrastructure privatization deals are long, and therefore the signing parties have to
realize that they are starting a long-term relation. Avoiding conflict by unambiguous and
early allocation of responsibilities and risk builds confidence and trust in the participants.
making easier the development of the contract and future relations. Even further, this may
cieate an attractive 'environment' for potential entrants.
In my opinion, the main source of future conflict lies in the quality of the bidding
documents, the deficiency of the land procurement procedures and the liquidity of the
guarantees. Liquidity problems endanger a smooth development of the contract. Again,
there is no right answer regarding how liquid the guarantees should be. For instance, in
the case of Mexico and Argentina the compensation criteria was based on the increase of
the concession period, which is the least liquid alternative. However, policy makers have
to adjust to local conditions in order to be responsive to the private sector's needs,
without leaving aside the general public's interests. This means that if there is room for
win-win solutions while increasing the liquidity of the guarantees, policy makers should
proceed in that direction. Liquidity crisis can be very disruptive for the development of
the project, particularly since there are not flexible exit options.
Land availability does not necessarily have to be an issue -- as can be assumed
from the literature for Mexico or Argentina, however in Colombia it is. Even if the new
legislation allows the Ministry to pay market prices for land, unavailability of land when
required has been a problem. In contracts where the resources come from the capital
markets -- as opposed to the government, delays increase the cost of the project. If this
happens, the concessionaire would require a fair compensation for it, and therefore it will
undertake the process for it. Rush, lack of preparation, or even changing alignments are
among the reasons for these disruptions. There is the possibility that government officials
see compensation mechanisms as the way to solve any problem along the way, and
therefore preparation could be relieved to a second plane. I suggest that instead, the use
of the compensation should be seen by officials as a failure to deliver the agreed -- except
from the case of traffic level.
Bidding documents quality refers more specifically to designs, and traffic
projections. There is no right or wrong answer for the level of detail of the designs.
However, what must be avoided is a structure of pervasive incentives. In other words,
policy makers have to make an effort to determine the level of detail required for the
concessionaires to assume full responsibility for the cost overruns. If it turns out that
under no circumstance the private sector is willing to assume the responsibility, then the
policy makers have to minimize the risk for the government. For Colombia, in both cases
the answer seems to lead towards reducing uncertainty -- i.e., detailed designs. An
additional situation that may arise from a poor preparation of the project is the need for
alignment change, as it was the case in Mexico. Changing conditions once the contract
has been signed opens possibilities for conflict. This is not to say that required changes
should not be undertaken, but that it should be a clear objective of the parties to minimize
such situations. Having a contract that from the beginning is telling that future negotiation
is required or may be achieved may create pervasive incentives.
Traffic projections is another hot issue. It is very unlikely that the projections will
turn out accurate, despite how sophisticated they might be, particularly under changing
economic conditions. Therefore, and given that trust is vital for the healthy development
of the contract, policy makers should design a strategy responsive at this level. Although
vague, what I suggest as guidance is that projections should be undertaken at least as
sophisticated as the private sector would. It is clear that this statement does not provide
an answer, that different bidders would be willing to spend a different level of resources
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and that they may have an incentive to require more than they would do. However, this
principle provides a basis for behavior, a guidance.
By now it must be clear, that privatization is no more than joining efforts to deliver
win-win situations -- particularly on behalf of the public's interest -- by taking advantage
of the capabilities and expertise of each of the parties involved. Few principles guide
privatization and the search for a successful implementation is the challenge for policy
makers.
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ANNEX 2.
Standard & Poor's Corporate and Municipal Rating Definitions. 23
For debt obligations issued outside the US, the ratings are calculated on the same basis
than for domestic corporate and municipal bonds. The ratings measure the
creditworthiness of the obligator but do not take into account currency exchange and
related uncertainties.
The ratings are based, in varying degrees, on the following considerations:
1. Likelihood of default-capacity and willingness of the obligator as to the timely
payment of interest and repayment of principal in accordance with the terms of the
obligation;
2. Nature of and provisions of obligation;
3. Protection afforded by, and relative position of, the obligation in the event of
bankruptcy, reorganization or other arrangement under the laws of bankruptcy and
other laws affecting creditor's rights.
AAA Debt rated 'AAA' has the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor's. Capacity
to pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong.
AA Debt rated 'AA' has a very strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal and
differs from the higher rated issues only in small degree.
A Debt rated 'A' has a strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal although it is
somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances and
economic conditions than debt in higher rated categories.
BBB Debt rated 'BBB' is regarded as having adequate capacity to pay interest and repay
principal. Whereas it normally exhibits adequate protection parameters, adverse economic
23 Source: Standard & Poor's, Bond Guide, April 1996, New York, N.Y.
conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to
pay interest and repay principal for debt in this category than in higher rated categories.
BB, B, CCC, CC, C Debt rated 'BB'. 'B', "CCC'. 'CC' and 'C' is regarded, on the
balance, as predominantly speculative with respect to capacity to pay interest and repay
principal in accordance to the terms of the obligation. 'BB' indicates the lowest degree of
speculation and 'C' the highest degree of speculation. While such debt will likely have
some quality and protective characteristics, these are outweighed by large uncertainties or
major risk exposures to adverse conditions.
Plus (+) or Minus (-): The ratings from 'AAA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the
addition of a plus or minus sign to show relative standing within the major categories.
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